# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – LPE K

#### 1] The 1AC’s construct of the firm as the locus of competitive innovation reproduces neoclassical economic orthodoxy. Antitrust is justified as an intervention to correct “market failures.” Market failure relies on the ideal of perfect competition.

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­ “[T]oo often discourse about ‘the market’ conveys the sense of something definite—a space or constitution of exchange...when in fact, sometimes unknown to the term’s user, it is being employed as a metaphor of economic process, or an idealisation or abstraction from that process.” – E.P. Thompson2 Introduction To those who study governance of the labor relationship, it is obvious that the relationship between business and labor must be governed, and that stability in this social relation is something valued by labor, business, and society writ large.3 Strangely, the idea that governance is necessary and price stability is good are both obscure interlopers to the study of competition law. To bridge the gap between these two areas of law--and incidentally give labor a greater role and stature in theorizing competition law--we aim to provide a general “market governance” framework for understanding how markets are governed in the context of the legal rules that allow and disallow certain forms of coordination. This framework draws from multiple heterodox traditions in political economy, but is particularly oriented toward building out the emerging framework of Neochartalist microeconomics.4

[Insert Footnote 4 – Turner]

Neochartalism, or Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), began as a macroeconomic framework for understanding how legal institutions produce and reproduce money and monetary value, particularly the acceptance of monetary objects in payments of taxes and court-ordered obligations. In developing over the last twenty-five years, Neochartalism has become an interdisciplinary perspective for understanding and reinterpreting a variety of social phenomena. Some scholarship, particularly the path-breaking work of the late economist Fred Lee (who we rely on in conceptualizing issues in this chapter) builds up a microeconomic framework that is uniquely consistent with--and reliant on--MMT insights. We hope others choose to follow Lee and ourselves in making contributions to Neochartalist Microeconomics and expanding the reach of Neochartalism in a variety of subfields that remain dominated by mainstream microeconomics.

While it is beyond the scope of the current chapter to identify all the ways in which our current perspective accords with unique insights of Neochartalism, our focus on potential financial and market instability, money prices and money income as a focus of analysis rather than relative prices and “real variables'' reflect our Neochartalist lens. Our focus on the legal construction of markets also adds to Neochartalism’s emphasis on the legal construction of a monetary production economy in general. Our focus on inherent and irreducible mediated social interdependence also accords with the scholarly perspective that Neochartalist humanities scholars bring to Neochartalism e.g. SCOTT FERGUSON, DECLARATIONS OF DEPENDENCE: MONEY, AESTHETICS, AND THE POLITICS OF CARE (2018).

[End footnote 4]

Arriving at a theory of market governance requires rejecting economic common sense. Far too much economics scholarship--both among orthodox scholars and their critics--treats “perfect competition” as the analytical (and often normative) baseline for all markets, including labor markets. Under perfect competition, prices (including wages) are arrived at entirely via the uncoordinated matching of bids and asks, assumed to result in settled equilibriums represented by intersecting supply and demand curves. If all markets are perfectly competitive (and certain other conditions obtain), then each input and output has its proper price which sends “signals” throughout the economy and results in a perfectly “efficient” allocation of resources. From this perspective, coordination, especially coordination over prices (again, including wages), appears as an unnatural intervention, a way for those acting collectively to collect “rents” above the “real” value of their contribution to society. If coordination is to be justified, it is usually to correct for some other deviation from perfect competition: workers might bargain collectively to capture some of a monopsonist's rents, for example. And, indeed, many of those trained in economics who advocate for collective bargaining or other worker-empowerment measures appeal to one or more “market failures”.5 In doing so, they reproduce the idea— intentionally or not—that if competition were finally left to do its work it would reveal the prices that reflect the allocation of goods and services that perfectly matches relative scarcity, that markets would work “better” if they were moved “closer” to (or to “resemble” or “approximate”) the “competitive” ideal.6 Collective bargaining is a distortion, but it is the best we can do in our distorted world.

But here's the rub: collective bargaining is not a distortion of a preexisting “labor market”. More generally, coordination between market participants (over price or other matters) is not in itself a distortion of any market. There is not and has never been a market without coordination, including over prices.

#### 2] Neoclassical paradigm will destroy humanity and the biosphere.

Anne **FREMAUX** PhD Political Ecology & Philosophy @ Grenoble ‘**19** *After the Anthropocene: Green Republicanism in a Post-Capitalist World* p. 1-3

If the main starting point of this book is the severe environmental crisis we are facing and the natural planet-wide collapse toward which we are heading, today’s ecological reality is powerfully connected to other issues such as growing socioeconomic inequalities, the erosion of democratic institutions, the organized apathy of citizens, the loss of power of nation-states in favor of corporations, the progressive disappearance of the notion of common good, and the economic colonization of the social, cultural, and political life by economic objectives. The global ecological crisis reveals these interlinked disasters caused by the core components of capitalism that include: an excessive exploitation of nature, the rise of industrialism, the self-destructive over- confidence in human-technical power, the arrogant anthropocentric mind- set, and denial of ecological limits, as well as the narrow rationalism and materialism that develop within a reductionist predominant form of science.

Neoliberalism as a ‘global system’ threatens societies as a whole and more especially the core values of social communities and democracy, such as justice, ‘common decency,’ civic virtue, or citizenship. In neoliberal patterns, economic efficiency, market values, employability, consumer freedom, and instrumental rationality are favored over democratic participation, civic values, personal autonomy, active citizenship, intellectual development (‘enlightenment’1), and moral rationality (reasonability2). Institutions dedicated to the common good are systematically turned into competitive structures to satisfy the interests of markets and greedy elites. Pluralism is disappearing under the assault of a one-dimensional consumer pattern which treats humans and non-humans as commodities under the hegemony of private interests. Civil society, an essential element of the agonistic and critical democracy defended in this book, is losing out to ‘spectator democracy.’ Indeed, citizens are more and more passive and self-centered in part because existing political and democratic structures leave them with few opportunities to participate and make collective decisions. As a consequence, the link between democratic politics and citizens is being critically weakened. Neoliberal individuals end up being overtaken by lassitude and resignation, indifference, and loss of interest for the shared common world. What defines neoliberal society is, indeed, a widespread disaffection for democracy and social bonds entailed by the loss of political agency and self-determination. In such a system, propaganda is necessary to manufacture consent3 and to shape the fundamental values to ensure that individuals see themselves as consumers, workers, or owners of capital, rather than citizens, spiritual or relational individuals, friends, or members of social and ecological communities. In order to be fully operational, such a system must also rely on high doses of cynicism and the value of relativism cultivated by deconstructive postmodern views.

Neoliberal competitive market-state systems have colonized all aspects of life, but mainly, they have subjugated nature and used it as an ‘unlimited’ spring of profit and resources intended to feed the logic of growth. The globalized neoliberal framework behaves as if nature were only a neutral background for profit-seeking and economic development. In order to push back the ecological limits that are more and more visible, neoliberals argue that those limits can be transcended through decoupling and technological innovations (Chapter 5). Indeed, constructivist neoliberal governments act as if the biosphere were a mere component of the socioeconomic sphere. As an anti-ecological ideology, neoliberalism denies the existence of natural limits and promotes unlimited material wants vs. limited resources, a cult of endless consumption (consumerism), and techno-fixes (techno-optimism) as the solution to social and ecological problems. The appropriation and commodification of nature undertaken by this form of economic ideology and the freedom it enshrines—understood mainly as the legitimate exercise of extractive power—entail that the environment is viewed only as an instrumental source of raw material and sinks of fossil fuels rather than as an ethically valuable physical, biological, and chemical context of life. Inevitably, this type of economy has supported an insatiable extraction that is today overwhelming ecosystemic capacities. Neoclassical economics is certainly the instrumental form of rationality ‘that most actively opposes the ethical valuation of the environment’ (Smith, 2001: 26).

The neoliberal capitalist agenda, associated with an arrogant anthropocentrism and the technological optimism of many political leaders, experts, techno-scientists, academics, and citizens, has transformed nature and people into raw materials (‘natural’ and ‘human resources’). It has replaced democratic and republican institutions—defined by their concern for the common good—by structures aiming at facilitating the activities and profits of corporations and markets. It has deprived Western political structures of substantial democratic energy by turning citizens of wealthy liberal nations into demoralized and nihilist homo oeconomicus (‘neoliberal citizens’), that is, passive consumers as opposed to active citizens. More than that, neoliberalism, through mass media, entertainment, information, and educational systems, has incrementally converted all the spheres, activities, and dimen- sions of life into economic ones (‘economization’ or ‘marketization’ of life). Private and public institutions are used as ways to transmit the values of capitalism.4 As an unethical and unsustainable model of commercialization, ultraliberal capitalism supports crass commodification, intensifies ine-ualities and transforms everything in its way—from non-human nature to human beings—into replaceable, dispensable and disposable products. As a global threat, neoliberalism leads to ‘environmental stresses (water shortages, deforestation, soil erosion or climate change), food and energy insecurity, peak oil, rising poverty and inequalities within and between societies, increasing passivity of citizens within democracies and the inexorable rise of corporate power within and over the democratic state’ (Barry, 2008: 3).

The price we, humans, are socially, politically and ecologically paying and will continue to pay in the future for the triumph of the neoliberal ideology is disproportionate with anything humankind has experienced so far (see Fig. 1.2). However, human relatively recent history already shows that the popular passivity and political apathy (mentioned above) fostered by cynical and disempowering systems of ideas have the potential to favour the rise of dictatorial regimes in which a father figure or ‘strong man’ could take upon the conduct of public affairs. At a time when chauvinistic, racist, anti-elitist, and macho-ist parties are dangerously rising in all Western countries, this fear is taking a serious turn, which includes the risk of an authoritarian ecology.

#### 3] We should use the framework of challenge-driven political economy instead of a competitiveness framework. Using the power of the state to make and shape markets is key to direct policy to solve inequality and climate change.

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Twenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges. Sometimes referred to as ‘grand challenges’, these include threats like climate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns, as well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Against this background, policymakers are increasingly embracing the idea of using industrial and innovation policy to tackle these ‘grand challenges’. Examples of challenge-led policy frameworks include the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; Borras,­­ 2019), the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and development programme (Mazzucato, 2018a), and the UK’s 2017 Industrial Strategy White Paper (HM Government, 2018).

Challenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to well-established modernization and competitiveness frameworks**.** While 1 2 modernization, and in particular competitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures,3 a challenge-driven agenda does not have such clearly defined theoretical origins and analytical lenses. As Richard Nelson argued in 1977 in his seminal book The Moon and the Ghetto, getting man to the moon and back is not the same as solving the problem of ghettos in American cities. Put differently, the nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges. We can discover answers to technical puzzles; socio-economic issues do not have a single correct discoverable solution. Such issues require continuous discussion, experimentation, and learning.

We believe challenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is, for example, more inclusive and sustainable. Such a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating (Mazzucato, 2016). This is a question of both theory and policy practice. In theory, challenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). In policy practice, directed policies require rethinking what is meant by ‘vertical policies’.

Industrial policies have always been composed of both a horizontal and a vertical element. Horizontal policies have historically been focused on skills, infrastructure, and education, while vertical policies have focused on sectors like transport, health, energy, or technologies. These two traditional approaches roughly embody differing schools of economics: neoclassical economics-inspired horizontal policies focusing on supply-side factors and inputs; and evolutionary economics-inspired policies putting emphasis on demand-side factors and systemic interactions (Nelson and Winter, 1974; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006 for a synthesis). Although certain sectors might be more suited to sectorspecific vertical strategies, the ‘grand challenges’ expressed in SDGs are cross-sectoral by nature and hence we cannot simply apply a vertical approach to them. Both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development, without specifying its nature. In policy this has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators (e.g. exports, patents) (Drechsler, 2019). Yet, many SDGs are only indirectly related to the economy and hence many of the key issues around SDGs have not been theorized in the context of innovation and industrial policy (see, e.g., Zehavi and Brenzitz, 2017).

In this chapter we argue that through well-defined goals, or more specifically ‘missions’, that are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further (Mazzucato, 2017; Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). The result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability. This ‘mission-oriented’ approach to industrial policy is not about top-down planning by an overbearing state; it is about providing a direction for growth, increasing business expectations about future growth areas, and catalysing activity—self-discovery by firms (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003)—that otherwise would not happen (Mazzucato and Perez, 2015). It is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field, nor about supporting more competitive sectors over less (Aghion et al., 2015), since the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals, such as the SDGs. However, we argue, to achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures. Indeed, we argue that if we want to take grand challenges such as the SDGs seriously as policy goals, market shaping should become the overarching approach followed in various policy fields.

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### 1NC – Regulate CP

#### The USFG should:

-adequately finance and study industrial surge capabilities.

-fully fund the department of defense and state

-provide government backed loan guarantees to companies competing with dominant players in the Defense industrial base

#### Surge capabilities solve

Mark Cancian [their author] 21, 1-19-2021, "US War Surge Production Too Slow, CSIS Finds," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/us-war-surge-production-too-slow-csis-finds/ ak

So, What To Do?

The services are unlikely to put much money into industrial surge. Their budgets are already stretched to modernize forces, sustain readiness, and maintain force size, particularly with the budget flat, at best, in real terms. Nevertheless, there are some useful things that the services could do:

Study industrial surge. Despite the importance of industrial surge, analyses of the industrial base focus almost entirely on peacetime production. Only two studies in the last decade were dedicated to examining wartime industrial surge. DOD needs to understand the challenges better if it is going to hedge against them. The Pentagon could begin by reviewing the production data in the budget justification books. Many programs reviewed in the study had erroneous or anomalous data, indicating a lack of attention to surge capabilities.

Identify low-cost ways to relieve bottlenecks. There are likely small investments that could greatly increase surge production, for example, the addition of a critical machine tool or support for a key supplier. The Defense Production Act provides a mechanism to provide the needed funding.

Ascertain wartime attrition and expenditure rates. As noted with the example on tank attrition, combat losses might be very high. DOD should do historical analyses to shed light on what attrition rates for different kinds of systems might be under various scenarios.

Identify supplemental acquisition strategies ahead of time. Even with enhanced surge capabilities, the industrial base is unlikely to produce all that the services require. Thus, it would be worthwhile identifying civilian systems that might be quickly converted to military use and foreign systems that the United States might acquire in an emergency.

A long great power conflict is not the most likely scenario the United States faces in the future. However, it is a plausible scenario that the current and likely future defense strategies envision. Surging industrial mobilization did not happen overnight in the past two great power conflicts that the United States fought, and the United States should expect an even shorter lead time in a future conflict. Therefore, the Defense Department should take steps now both to understand the challenges that this surging industrial capacity presents and then to hedge against them.

#### As do budget increases.

William Inboden [their author],, 12-23-2018, "10 reasons US military strength remains essential," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/421970-10-reasons-us-military-strength-remains-essential?rl=1

As the new Congress prepares to convene in January, it will face few tasks, if any, more important than adequately funding our nation’s defense. While our armed forces’ most fundamental mission lies in defending our nation and deterring our adversaries, a strong defense budget brings many other strategic benefits.

Five years ago, when testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then-CENTCOM Commander Gen. James Mattis made a memorable plea for the State Department’s budget: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.”

In this oft-quoted statement, Mattis offered an arresting argument for the importance of the State Department and diplomacy in preventing armed conflict and security threats to the United States. Yet the opposite also is true: to strengthen the State Department, along with U.S. diplomatic and economic influence, we need a large defense budget.

#### Loan guarantees solve without breaking up industry.

Bova ‘8 (Ben; president emeritus of the National Space Society, author of more than 120 science works; 10/12/08; “Message on Space Solar Power to the next President of the United States”; <https://space.nss.org/message-on-space-solar-power-to-the-next-president-of-the-united-states/>; National Space Society; accessed 9/1/19; TV)

Private investors usually consider three factors before they plunk their dollars into a new venture. First, how big an investment is needed? Second, how risky is the project? Third, how long before I see a return on my investment? A billion-dollar investment isn’t peanuts, although the private capital market raises that kind of money all the time. The risk involved with building an SPS is considerable, however. Although the basic technologies involved are well-known, space operations are inherently risky. Finally, it could be many years or even decades before an investment in SPS begins to pay off. How can we get private investors to put their money into Solar Power Satellites? This nation tackled a similar situation about a century ago, when faced with the problem of building big hydroelectric dams. Those dams were on the cutting edge of technology at the time, and they were risky endeavors that required hefty funding. Hoover Dam, the Grand Coulee and others were built with private investment – backed by long-term, low-interest loans guaranteed by the U.S. government. Those dams changed the face of the American west, providing irrigation water and electrical power that stimulated enormous economic growth. Phoenix and Las Vegas wouldn’t be on the map, except for those dams. The electricity that powered crucial parts of the Manhattan Project atomic bomb program came from those dams. Solar Power Satellites could be funded the same way, through government-back loans. Not a penny from the taxpayers’ pockets. The federal government has backed such loan guarantees in the past to help troubled corporations such as Chrysler and Lockheed. Why not use the same technique to encourage private investment in Solar Power Satellites? Moreover, a vigorous SPS program would provide a viable market for the private companies that are developing rocket launchers. Several companies are working on efficient, reliable launch vehicles that can bring down the costs of launching people and payloads into space. SpaceX Corporation successfully placed a satellite in orbit a few weeks ago with its privately-developed Falcon 1 launch vehicle. Virgin Galactic – the partnership of designer Burt Rutan and British entrepreneur Richard Branson – is developing the SpaceShip Two rocket vehicle that will carry paying customers to the edge of space. But like most new industries, these and the other private space companies are caught in a conundrum: they need a market that offers a payoff, but no market will materialize until they can prove that their product works. The fledgling aircraft industry faced this conundrum in the 1920s. The federal government helped to provide a market for them by giving them contracts to deliver air mail. Out of that beginning arose eventually today’s commercial airline industry. A vigorous SPS program could provide the market that the newborn private space-launch industry needs. And remember, a rocket launcher that can put people and payloads into orbit profitably can also fly people and cargo across the Earth at hypersonic speed. Anywhere on Earth can be less than an hour’s flight away. That’s a market worth trillions of dollar per year. ROI, indeed.

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### 1NC – Biz Con DA

#### The plan creates a chilling effect that crushes business confidence and investment

Hathout 9/23 – Ahmad Hathout, reporter focusing on the tech and telecommunications industries, citing a panel event hosted by the Institute for Policy Innovation, “Washington’s Antitrust Push Could Create ‘Chilling Effect’ on Startups, Observers Say,” 9/23/21, https://broadbandbreakfast.com/2021/09/washingtons-antitrust-push-could-create-chilling-effect-on-startups-observers-say/

WASHINGTON, September 23, 2021 – Advocates for less government encroachment on big technology companies are warning that antitrust is being weaponized for political ends that may end up placing a “chilling effect” on innovative businesses.

The Institute for Policy Innovation held a web event Wednesday to discuss antitrust and the modern economy. Panelists noted their concern that antitrust law may be welded with political aims that will ultimately create a precedent whereby the federal government will stifle innovators who get too big.

Jessica Melugin, the director of the Center for Technology and Innovation, said technology companies could see what’s happening in Washington – with lots of talk of breaking up companies deemed too big – and be uncertain of the future.

She noted that growing companies largely seek one of two things to make it big: grow to file an initial public offering, where the company’s shares are publicly traded, or wait until a large company buys you out. She said talk emanating from the White House and Washington generally about regulating the industry could deter larger companies from acquiring them, and onerous financial regulations could put a damper on IPO dreams.

“If you start robbing companies of other smaller companies they purchased, it’s going to give a lot of entrepreneurs and a lot of funders in Silicon Valley pause,” Melugin said. “If another path to success gets blocked – the IPO is now harder, and now acquisitions are a little bit questionable…that’s a chilling effect.”

President Joe Biden has made a number of appointments to key positions that is bringing more attention on Big Tech, including known Amazon critic Lina Khan to chair the Federal Trade Commission, which recently filed an amended case against Facebook for alleged anticompetitive practices. He also appointed antitrust expert and Google critic Jonathan Kanter as assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s antitrust division.

FTC could set a bad precedent if focus is ‘big is bad’

Christopher Koopman, the executive director at the Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University, said he’s concerned about the precedent Khan could set for big companies.

He said the odds are that once Khan starts, she will continue down “this path of ‘big is bad’ because that’s a prior that she has and she’s continued to operate on her entire professional career. It just so happens that the focus of this is on tech companies.

“We may be building a regulatory apparatus that will continue to burrow a hole right down the middle of the American economy before we even have a chance to ask if that’s really what we want,” Koopman added. “We just have to recognize that it doesn’t matter, really, who is running the FTC – once we tell the FTC to go break up big companies, they’re going to go break up big companies.”

#### Unpredictable shifts ruin biz con and overall growth

Cambon 21 – Sarah Chaney Cambon, reporter on The Wall Street Journal's Economics Team, “Capital-Spending Surge Further Lifts Economic Recovery”, 6/27/2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/capital-spending-surge-further-lifts-economic-recovery-11624798800

Business investment is emerging as a powerful source of U.S. economic growth that will likely help sustain the recovery.

Companies are ramping up orders for computers, machinery and software as they grow more confident in the outlook.

Nonresidential fixed investment, a proxy for business spending, rose at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 11.7% in the first quarter, led by growth in software and tech-equipment spending, according to the Commerce Department. Business investment also logged double-digit gains in the third and fourth quarters last year after falling during pandemic-related shutdowns. It is now higher than its pre-pandemic peak.

Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft, another measure for business investment, are near the highest levels for records tracing back to the 1990s, separate Commerce Department figures show.

“Business investment has really been an important engine powering the U.S. economic recovery,” said Robert Rosener, senior U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley. “In our outlook for the economy, it’s certainly one of the bright spots.”

Consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of economic output, is driving the early stages of the recovery. Americans, flush with savings and government stimulus checks, are spending more on goods and services, which they shunned for much of the pandemic.

Robust capital investment will be key to ensuring that the recovery maintains strength after the spending boost from fiscal stimulus and business reopenings eventually fades, according to some economists.

Rising business investment helps fuel economic output. It also lifts worker productivity, or output per hour. That metric grew at a sluggish pace throughout the last economic expansion but is now showing signs of resurgence.

The recovery in business investment is shaping up to be much stronger than in the years following the 2007-09 recession. “The events especially in late ’08, early ’09 put a lot of businesses really close to the edge,” said Phil Suttle, founder of Suttle Economics. “I think a lot of them said, ‘We’ve just got to be really cautious for a long while.’”

Businesses appear to be less risk-averse now, he said.

After the financial crisis, businesses grew by adding workers, rather than investing in capital. Hiring was more attractive than capital spending because labor was abundant and relatively cheap. Now the supply of workers is tight. Companies are raising pay to lure employees. As a result, many firms have more incentive to grow by investing in capital.

Economists at Morgan Stanley predict that U.S. capital spending will rise to 116% of prerecession levels after three years. By comparison, investment took 10 years to reach those levels once the 2007-09 recession hit.

Company executives are increasingly confident in the economy’s trajectory. The Business Roundtable’s economic-outlook index—a composite of large companies’ plans for hiring and spending, as well as sales projections—increased by nine points in the second quarter to 116, just below 2018’s record high, according to a survey conducted between May 25 and June 9. In the second quarter, the share of companies planning to boost capital investment increased to 59% from 57% in the first.

“We’re seeing really strong reopening demand, and a lot of times capital investment follows that,” said Joe Song, senior U.S. economist at BofA Securities.

Mr. Song added that less uncertainty regarding trade tensions between the U.S. and China should further underpin business confidence and investment. “At the very least, businesses will understand the strategy that the Biden administration is trying to follow and will be able to plan around that,” he said.

#### Extended COVID economic decline causes multilateral meltdown – causes nuclear war, climate change, Arctic and space war.

McLennan 21 – Strategic Partners Marsh McLennan SK Group Zurich Insurance Group, Academic Advisers National University of Singapore Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, “The Global Risks Report 2021 16th Edition” “http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_The\_Global\_Risks\_Report\_2021.pdf

Forced to choose sides, governments may face economic or diplomatic consequences, as proxy disputes play out in control over economic or geographic resources. The deepening of geopolitical fault lines and the lack of viable middle power alternatives make it harder for countries to cultivate connective tissue with a diverse set of partner countries based on mutual values and maximizing efficiencies. Instead, networks will become thick in some directions and non-existent in others. The COVID-19 crisis has amplified this dynamic, as digital interactions represent a “huge loss in efficiency for diplomacy” compared with face-to-face discussions.23 With some alliances weakening, diplomatic relationships will become more unstable at points where superpower tectonic plates meet or withdraw.

At the same time, without superpower referees or middle power enforcement, global norms may no longer govern state behaviour. Some governments will thus see the solidification of rival blocs as an opportunity to engage in regional posturing, which will have destabilizing effects.24 Across societies, domestic discord and economic crises will increase the risk of autocracy, with corresponding censorship, surveillance, restriction of movement and abrogation of rights.25 Economic crises will also amplify the challenges for middle powers as they navigate geopolitical competition. ASEAN countries, for example, had offered a potential new manufacturing base as the United States and China decouple, but the pandemic has left these countries strapped for cash to invest in the necessary infrastructure and productive capacity.26 Economic fallout is pushing many countries to debt distress (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2021). While G20 countries are supporting debt restructure for poorer nations,27 larger economies too may be at risk of default in the longer term;28 this would leave them further stranded—and unable to exercise leadership—on the global stage.

Multilateral meltdown Middle power weaknesses will be reinforced in weakened institutions, which may translate to more uncertainty and lagging progress on shared global challenges such as climate change, health, poverty reduction and technology governance. In the absence of strong regulating institutions, the Arctic and space represent new realms for potential conflict as the superpowers and middle powers alike compete to extract resources and secure strategic advantage.29 If the global superpowers continue to accumulate economic, military and technological power in a zero-sum playing field, some middle powers could increasingly fall behind. Without cooperation nor access to important innovations, middle powers will struggle to define solutions to the world’s problems. In the long term, GRPS respondents forecasted “weapons of mass destruction” and “state collapse” as the two top critical threats: in the absence of strong institutions or clear rules, clashes— such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Galwan Valley—may more frequently flare into full-fledged interstate conflicts,30 which is particularly worrisome where unresolved tensions among nuclear powers are concerned. These conflicts may lead to state collapse, with weakened middle powers less willing or less able to step in to find a peaceful solution.

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### 1NC – FTC Tradeoff DA

#### The aff unduly burdens federal agencies – high costs, delays, and complex litigation sap resources.

Chopra & Khan ’20 [Rohit; Commissioner @ Federal Trade Commission; and Lina; Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking,” *The University of Chicago Law Review* *87*(2), p. 357-380; AS]

The current approach to antitrust also makes enforcement highly costly and protracted. In 2012, the American Bar Association (ABA) published the report of a task force that sought to “study ways to control the costs of antitrust litigation and enforcement.”9 The task force, the authors explained, was “a response to concerns” about both “the costs imposed on businesses by the American system of antitrust enforcement” and “the length of time required to resolve antitrust issues both in litigation and in enforcement proceedings.”10 Out-of-control costs undermine effective antitrust enforcement by agencies and private litigants, but may advantage actors who profit from anticompetitive practices and can treat litigation as a routine cost of business. Professor Michael Baye and Former Commissioner Joshua Wright have noted that generalist judges may be ill-equipped to independently analyze and assess evidence presented by economic experts.11 Because determining the legality of most conduct now involves complex economic analysis, courts have effectively “delegate[d] both factfinding and rulemaking to courtroom economists,” making courtroom economics “not just inevitable but often dispositive.”12 In fact, paid expert testimony now is often “the ‘whole game’ in an antitrust dispute.”13

Paid experts are a major expense. Some experts charge over $1,300 an hour, earning more than senior partners at major law firms.14 Over the last decade, expenditures on expert costs by public enforcers have ballooned.15 In a system that incentivizes firms to spend top dollar on economists who can use ever-increasing complexity to spin a favorable tale, the eye-popping costs for economic experts can put the government and new market entrants at a significant disadvantage.16 Another component of the burden is that antitrust trials are extremely slow and prolonged.17 The Supreme Court has criticized antitrust cases for involving “interminable litigation”18 and the “inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase,”19 yielding an antitrust system that is “hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision.”20 That it can easily take a decade to bring an antitrust case to full judgment means that by the time a judge orders a remedy, market circumstances are likely to have outpaced it.21 The same 2012 ABA report suggested that lengthy, costly litigation may be contributing to reduced government-enforcement efforts over time relative to the expansion of the US economy.22

#### Resources are key to FTC privacy leadership.

Hoofnagle et al. ’19 [Chris; 8/8/19; Adjunct Professor of Information and Law @ Cal; Woodrow Hartzog; Professor of Law and Computer Science @ Northeastern University; and Daniel Solove; John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law @ George Washington; “The FTC can rise to the privacy challenge, but not without help from Congress”; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/; AS]

We think the FTC is still the right agency to lead the US privacy regulatory effort. In this essay, we explain the FTC’s structural and cultural strengths for this task, and then turn to reforms that could help the FTC rise to modern information privacy challenges. Fundamentally, the FTC has the structure and the legal powers necessary to enforce reasonable privacy rules. But it does need to evolve to meet the challenge of regulating modern information platforms.

THE FTC WIELDS GREAT POWERS TEMPERED WITH EXPERIENCE

The FTC has remarkable powers. At its creation a century ago, Congress gave it unprecedented investigatory and enforcement tools. These have been broadened over time as the FTC has faced new wrongs. Today, the FTC can examine business practices even where there is no investigatory predicate, and as a general-purpose consumer protection agency, it can sue almost any business.

As a result, the FTC is nimble and can adapt to new technologies without an act of Congress. Founded in the days of misleading newspaper advertising, the FTC was quick to pivot to radio, television, and internet fraud. The breadth and generality of its powers are also a source of strength. Much more than just data protection, modern consumer problems involve platforms, power, information asymmetries, and market competition. In theory, the FTC has a broad enough jurisdiction and charge to handle diverse issues often labeled as “privacy,” such as algorithmic manipulation and accountability.

In the information economy, privacy is among the most important values that law and norms should protect. Yet at the same time, privacy must also accommodate other important values, including the risks inherent in economic development. In our view, privacy is a means to the ends of freedom and autonomy in our personal lives and in our polity. It is a key component for human flourishing.

THE FTC HAS ACHIEVED MUCH WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND WITHOUT CONSISTENT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Many privacy issues are thought to be new. But the FTC has decades of experience handling privacy problems, particularly in credit reporting and debt collection. The FTC’s earliest information privacy matters, in 1951 and then a series of cases in the 1970s, recognized the general consumer preference against commercialization of personal data. Using its enforcement powers, the FTC sued companies for deceptive data collection, and for the sale of data collected in preparing tax returns. The agency brought its first internet-related fraud case in 1994, long before most consumers shopped online. Since then, the FTC has pursued the biggest names in internet commerce. It has steadily broadened the duties for fair information handling, particularly in the information security domain.

The FTC’s broadest jurisdiction is its enforcement against unfair and deceptive practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Despite a wide reach, however, Section 5 has some significant limits in power. The FTC generally cannot issue a fine for Section 5 violations initially—fines can only be issued for violations of consent decrees, as happened in the Facebook case.

Resources are the FTC’s greatest constraint. It is a small agency charged with a broad mission in competition and consumer protection. It carries out this mission with a budget of just over $300 million and a total staff of about 1,100, of whom no more than 50 are tasked with privacy. In comparison, the U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has over 700 employees and a £38 million budget for a mission focused entirely on privacy and data protection. In addition, for much of modern history, Congress has kept the FTC on a short leash. In 1980, Congress punished the agency for being too aggressive, causing it to shut down twice. Congress has held authorization over the agency’s head and used oversight power to scrutinize what members of Congress perceive as the expansive use of FTC legal authority, including its interpretation of privacy harm.

Given these constraints, FTC attorneys make pragmatic choices in their case selection. At any given time, line attorneys are investigating many companies and weighing decisions on where to target limited enforcement resources. The FTC can only bring actions against a small fraction of infringers, and it has chosen cases wisely to make loud statements to industry about how to protect privacy.

Even with these severe limitations, it has managed to bolster important norms and send strong signals to industry that have influenced the practices of many companies. It has become a significant enforcement agency that industry pays attention to. It has an enforcement record that compares quite well to other agencies in the US as well as around the world.

Some critics of the Facebook settlement have focused only on its shortcomings. Despite flaws and limits in the consent order, the five-billion-dollar fine was the biggest privacy settlement worldwide by far. It is an order of magnitude greater than the highest fine under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation so far (the UK ICO’s €183 million fine against British Airways) and roughly double the record fine under EU competition law, which privacy advocates have urged as the reference for privacy fines.

The settlement also contains significant and noteworthy measures, such as forcing Facebook to make privacy a board-level concern and requiring Mark Zuckerberg to verify compliance. As dissenting Commissioners Chopra and Slaughter note, the FTC’s settlement doesn’t solve every problem; Facebook’s structure and business model remain the same. But no existing enforcement agency has come close to matching the FTC’s impact in this case, and foreign data protection agencies similar to proposed in the U.S. as FTC alternatives have not demonstrated the power or political capital to do so. As privacy enforcers go, the FTC stacks up well to others in many regards.

#### Privacy regulation is key to the liberal order – US leadership resolves the current patchwork of rules.

Slaughter & McCormick ’21 [Matthew; Paul Danos Dean and Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of International Business in the Tuck School of Business @ Dartmouth College, Former Member @ White House Council of Economic Advisers; and David; CEO @ Bridgewater Associates Former Senior Positions @ U.S. Commerce Department, the National Security Council, and U.S. Treasury Department; “Data Is Power: Washington Needs to Craft New Rules for the Digital Age,” *Foreign Affairs* 100(3), p. 54-63; AS]

A PATCHWORK OF RULES

Current international institutions are not equipped to handle the proliferation of data. Nor are they prepared to address the emerging fault lines in how to approach it. The institutional framework for international trade-that of the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-was built at a time when mainly agricultural and manufactured goods crossed borders and data flows were in the realm of fiction. The wTO's framework depends on two key classifications: whether something is a good or a service and where it originated. Goods are governed by different trade rules than are services, and a product's origin defines what duties or trade restrictions apply.

Data defies this basic categorization for several reasons. One is that vast amounts of data-such as one's online browsing before ordering clothes-are unpriced consequences of the production and consumption of other goods and services. Another is that it is often hard to determine where data is created and kept. (From which country does data on an international flight's engineering performance originate? In which country does a multinational firm's cloud storage of its clients' data reside?) Moreover, there is no agreed-on taxonomy for valuing data. In the event of a trade dispute, WTO members may seek legal recourse and ask the organization to make a one-off correction, but such fixes do not address the fundamental inconsistencies between the WTO's framework and the nature of data.

The lack of an internationally accepted framework governing data leaves big questions about the global economy and national security unanswered. Should sovereign governments be able to limit the location and use of their citizens' data within national borders? What does this concept even mean when the cloud and its data are distributed across the Internet? Should governments be able to tax the arrival of data from other nations, just as they levy tariffs on the import of many goods and services? How would this work when the data flows themselves are often unpriced, at least within the firms that gather the data? What controls can sovereign governments impose on data entering their countries? Can they demand that data be stored locally or that they be given access to it?

The absence of an international framework also threatens people's privacy. Who will ensure that governments or other actors do not misuse people's data and violate their economic, political, and human rights? How can governments protect their citizens' privacy while allowing data to move across borders? Today, the United States and the EU do not agree on answers to these questions, causing friction that hurts cooperation on trade, investment, and national security. China, for its part, has shown little commitment to privacy. Without common and verifiable methods of anonymizing data to protect personal privacy, the innovative potential of personal data will be lost-or fundamental rights will be violated.

In the absence of coherent and collective answers to these questions, countries and trade blocs are improvising on their own. This has left the world today with a collection of inconsistent, vague, and piecemeal regulations. Recent regional trade deals have included several provisions regarding data and e-commerce. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which does not include the United States, prohibits requirements that data be stored within a given country and bans duties on cross-border flows of electronic content. It recognizes the growing importance of the digital services sector, and it forbids signatories from demanding access to the source codes of companies' software. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) has similar provisions. Both free-trade agreements aim to allow unencumbered flows of data, but they are largely untested and, by virtue of being regional, are limited.

The EU sharpened its data rules on privacy in the General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR attempts to empower individuals to decide how companies can use their data, but many have voiced concerns that the GDPR has effectively established trade barriers for foreign firms operating in EU member countries by requiring expensive compliance measures and raising the European market's liability risks. Moreover, the EU's rules are the subject of continual dispute and litigation.

Of much greater concern to the United States is China's distinct digital ecosystem. Over a generation ago, China began building its "Great Firewall," a combination of laws and technologies that restrict the flow of data in and out of China, in part by blocking foreign websites. China has since adopted a techno-nationalist model that mandates government access to data generated in the country. The sheer quantity of that data fuels China's innovation but also enables the country's repressive system of control and surveillance-and at the expense of open, international flows of data.

Beijing now seeks to expand this model. It has clear plans to use its indigenous technology industry to dominate the digital platforms that manage data, most immediately 5G telecommunications networks. To that end, it has unveiled an audacious plan, China Standards 2035, to set global standards in emerging technologies. And through the so-called Digital Silk Road and the broader Belt and Road Initiative, it is working to spread its model of data governance and expand its access to data by building Internet infrastructure abroad and boosting digital trade.

And the United States? At the federal level, the country has not settled on any legal framework. Nor, beyond the USMCA, has it engaged in any meaningful cross-border agreements on data flows. So far, the United States has not answered China's efforts with a coherent plan to shape technology standards or ensure widespread privacy protections. The United States' ad hoc responses and targeted efforts to encourage other countries to reject the Chinese company Huawei's 5G technology may work in the near term. But they do not constitute an effective long-term plan for harnessing the power of data.

#### LIO prevents global great power war – the alternative is hostile competitive blocs that collapse weak states and undermine collective action on existential risks.

Beckley ’20 [Michael; Associate Professor of Political Science @ Tufts University; “Rogue Superpower Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century”; *Foreign Affairs* 99(6), p. 73-87]

What would happen to the world if the United States fully embraced this kind of “America first” vision? Some analysts paint catastrophic pictures. Robert Kagan foresees a return to the despotism, protectionism, and strife of the 1930s, with China and Russia reprising the roles of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Peter Zeihan predicts a violent scramble for security and resources, in which Russia invades its neighbors and East Asia descends into naval warfare. These forecasts may be extreme, but they reflect an essential truth: the postwar order, although flawed and incomplete in many ways, has fostered the most peaceful and prosperous period in human history, and its absence would make the world a more dangerous place.

Thanks to the U.S.-led order, for decades, most countries have not had to fight for market access, guard their supply chains, or even seriously defend their borders. The U.S. Navy has kept international waterways open, the U.S. market has provided reliable consumer demand and capital for dozens of countries, and U.S. security guarantees have covered nearly 70 nations. Such assurances have benefited everyone: not just Washington’s allies and partners but also its adversaries. U.S. security guarantees had the effect of neutering Germany and Japan, the main regional rivals of Russia and China, respectively. In turn, Moscow and Beijing could focus on forging ties with the rest of the world rather than fighting their historical enemies. Without U.S. patronage and protection, countries would have to get back in the business of securing themselves and their economic lifelines.

Such a world would see the return of great-power mercantilism and new forms of imperialism. Powerful countries would once again try to reduce their economic insecurity by establishing exclusive economic zones, where their firms could enjoy cheap and secure access to raw materials and large captive consumer markets. Today, China is already starting to do this with its Belt and Road Initiative, a network of infrastructure projects around the world; its “Made in China 2025” policy, to stimulate domestic production and consumption; and its attempts to create a closed-off, parallel Internet. If the United States follows suit, other countries will have to attach themselves to an American or a Chinese bloc—or forge blocs of their own. France might seek to restore its grip on its former African colonies. Russia might accelerate its efforts to corral former Soviet states into a regional trade union. Germany increasingly would have to look beyond Europe’s shrinking populations to find buyers for its exports—and it would have to develop the military capacity to secure those new far-flung markets and supply lines, too.

As great powers competed for economic spheres, global governance would erode. Geopolitical conflict would paralyze the UN, as was the case during the Cold War. NATO might dissolve as the United States cherry-picked partners. And the unraveling of the U.S. security blanket over Europe could mean the end of the European Union, too, which already suffers from deep divisions. The few arms control treaties that remain in force today might fall by the wayside as countries militarized to defend themselves. Efforts to combat transnational problems—such as climate change, financial crises, or pandemics—would mimic the world’s shambolic response to COVID-19, when countries hoarded supplies, the World Health Organization parroted Chinese misinformation, and the United States withdrew into itself.

The resulting disorder would jeopardize the very survival of some states. Since 1945, the number of countries in the world has tripled, from 46 to nearly 200. Most of these new states, however, are weak and lack energy, resources, food, domestic markets, advanced technology, military power, or defensible borders. According to research by the political scientist Arjun Chowdhury, two-thirds of all countries today cannot provide basic services to their people without international help. In short, most countries depend critically on the postwar order, which has offered historically unprecedented access to international aid, markets, shipping, and protection. Without such support, some countries would collapse or be conquered. Fragile, aid-dependent states such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Liberia are only some of the most obvious high-risk cases. Less obvious ones are capable but trade-dependent countries such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and South Korea, whose economic systems would struggle to function in a world of closed markets and militarized sea-lanes.

## Off

### 1NC – Budget DA

#### Biden’s influence will get budget compromise done- talks are working now

Pramuk 10-1-21

(Jacob, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/01/house-infrastructure-vote-democrats-try-to-reach-budget-spending-deal.html)

The House was expected to delay a vote on a bipartisan infrastructure bill Friday as President Joe Biden pushed congressional Democrats to forge a consensus on a broader spending deal. As his legislative priorities hung in the balance, Biden went to the Capitol on Friday afternoon to meet with House Democrats and rally support for his economic agenda. After being greeted by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., and her top deputies, the president spoke to a full Democratic caucus meeting, acknowledging both measures would have to be linked to pass. “I’m telling you, we’re going to get this done,” he told reporters as he left the Capitol. “It doesn’t matter when. It doesn’t matter whether it’s in six minutes, six days or six weeks, we’re going to get it done.” Pelosi had told centrist Democrats the chamber would pass the infrastructure plan by Thursday. Democratic leaders pushed the vote as progressives threatened to sink the bill until they get assurances the Senate will approve a broader plan to invest in party priorities including climate policy, household tax credits and health-care expansion. Democrats cited progress after a flurry of talks among White House officials and key members of Congress bled into early Friday morning. Pelosi had suggested the infrastructure bill could pass Friday, but a vote appeared unlikely as the progressive and centrist flanks of her party stood trillions of dollars apart on a desired price tag for the second spending package. Biden told lawmakers that in order to find a compromise with centrist senators, they would likely have to cut the overall spending in the Democratic bill to $2 trillion to $2.5 trillion, from the proposed $3.5 trillion, Rep. Henry Cuellar, D-Texas, told reporters. Rep. Pramila Jayapal, the Washington Democrat and Congressional Progressive Caucus chair who spearheaded the effort to delay the infrastructure vote, told reporters that Biden “was very clear the two [proposals] are tied together.” The House was in recess Friday as Democrats struggled to strike a deal that would allow them to hold a vote on the infrastructure bill. The chamber was reportedly considering a vote to reauthorize federal surface transportation funding, which expired at the end of the day Thursday when lawmakers did not approve the legislation. As the president and White House officials try to bridge a gulf between the liberal and centrist flanks of the party, press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters that “compromise is necessary, it’s inevitable.” The talks hold enormous stakes for the government benefits millions of Americans will receive in the coming years. Through their spending package, Biden and top Democrats aim to boost access to child care, paid leave, pre-K and community college. They hope to speed up green energy adoption and lower the Medicare eligibility age, while expanding coverage to include dental, vision and hearing benefits. The proposal would mean changes for corporations and the wealthiest Americans in the form of tax hikes to offset the new spending. Democrats have floated a 26.5% top corporate tax rate and 39.6% high individual rate — both levels below or in line with those set before the 2017 GOP tax cuts. But some of what Democratic leaders bill as a transformative plan in the mold of the New Deal could fall to the wayside as they try to win support from centrist holdouts, Sens. Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., will need both of their votes to push a bill through without Republicans in a chamber split 50-50 by party. Manchin has set a $1.5 trillion asking price for the plan — less than half of the $3.5 trillion investment his party set out to pass. It is unclear now where the sides can find a compromise or what they would cut from the proposal. Sinema left Washington on Friday as efforts to strike a deal continued, NBC News reported. She returned to Arizona for a medical appointment and expects to speak with White House officials Friday, Sinema spokesman John LaBombard told NBC. Late Thursday, Psaki said Democrats are “closer to an agreement than ever” after White House officials held a flurry of meetings with Pelosi, Schumer and other key lawmakers. She noted that “we are not there yet, and so, we will need some additional time” to strike a deal. “While Democrats do have some differences, we share common goals of creating good union jobs, building a clean energy future, cutting taxes for working families and small businesses, helping to give those families breathing room on basic expenses—and doing it without adding to the deficit, by making those at the top pay their fair share,” she said in a statement.

#### Antitrust action saps finite capital, imperils rest of agenda

Karaim 21

(Reed, <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2021050705>, 5-7)

Stucke, the former U.S. Justice Department antitrust official, says that despite Wu and Khan's credentials and reputation, changing antitrust policy will require a concerted effort. With Biden having an ambitious overall agenda and his Democratic Party holding the slimmest possible majority in the Senate, Stucke says, the question is “to what extent will the Biden administration want to expend political capital on this. They've got some bipartisan support for antitrust reform, but to what extent are they going to mobilize that?”

#### Budget key to solve climate change.

Dino Grandoni and Brady Dennis 8/11/21. Reporter covering energy and environmental policy. Reporter focusing on environmental policy and public health issues. “Biden aims for sweeping climate action as infrastructure, budget bills advance”. Washington Post. Aug 11 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/08/10/biden-climate-congress/

After years of dragging their feet, lawmakers in Washington advanced a pair of major bills this week that include significant provisions for tackling climate change as scientists continue to ring alarm bells about the state of the planet.

The Senate approved on Tuesday a sweeping bipartisan $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill with funding for many public works meant to cut climate-warning emissions. A day later, Democrats in the chamber took a major step to adopt an even bigger, $3.5 trillion budget bill supporting yet more programs for cleaning up power plants and cars.

Each, if passed, would invest billions of dollars in the sort of clean energy transition the United States must make to have any chance of hitting the goal set by President Biden to cut the nation’s emissions by at least 50 percent by the end of this decade.

“This was one of the most significant legislative days we’ve had in a long time here,” Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) told reporters Wednesday.

But both bills face a potentially bumpy road ahead. Democrats still need to draft in committees the details of their massive budget reconciliation package over the coming weeks, with not a single vote to spare in the 50-50 split Senate. The bipartisan public-works bill, meanwhile, still needs approval from the House, where progressive Democrats hold significant sway.

The moves on Capitol Hill come as hundreds of scientists detailed this week the intensifying fires, floods and other catastrophes that will continue to worsen until humans dramatically scale back greenhouse gas emissions.

Scientists assembled by the United Nations made clear in a landmark report Monday that time is running out for the world to make immediate and dramatic cuts to emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels and other human activities. U.N. Secretary General António Guterres called the sobering, sprawling report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change a “code red for humanity.”

But it remains unclear whether the new findings alone will be enough to spur new action in a Washington as politically divided as ever.

Climate change remains a distinctly fraught issue in the United States compared with many other countries, with the de facto leader of one of the two major parties — former president Donald Trump — dismissing the scientific consensus about human-caused climate change and downplaying its risks throughout his term.

Even if Congress passes bills with big climate provisions, regulations from the Biden administration are vulnerable to being reined in by federal court judges appointed by Trump and the most conservative Supreme Court in a generation. And the fate of many of the administration’s climate initiatives could depend on the Democratic Party retaining control of Congress — and on how Biden himself fares if he runs again in 2024.

If Biden and his Democratic allies in Congress succeed in shifting the nation rapidly toward a greener future, the math of climate change means that the rest of the world would have to follow suit, and quickly. The United States accounts for only about one-seventh of global emissions. The rest of the world — particularly the world’s largest emitter, China — would need to set more aggressive goals for reducing footprints as well.

Other countries have taken steps to do that. The European Union, for instance, agreed earlier this year to cut carbon emissions as a bloc by at least 55 percent by 2030. But how aggressively China, India, Russia and other nations will move in the years ahead remains an open question.

World leaders already faced mounting pressure to arrive at a major U.N. climate conference scheduled this fall in Scotland with more ambitious, concrete plans to slow greenhouse gas pollution. That pressure grew only more intense after Monday’s IPCC assessment, which found that the world is quickly running out of time to meet the goals of the 2015 Paris agreement.

The report found that humans can only unleash less than 500 additional gigatons of carbon dioxide — the equivalent of about 10 years of current global emissions — to have an even chance of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels.

The hopes of hitting that target, the most aspirational goal outlined in the Paris accord, will soon slip away without rapid action, the report made clear. After all, the world has already warmed more than 1 degree Celsius (1.8 degrees Fahrenheit), with few signs of slowing unless nations begin to cut emissions at a rate unprecedented in history.

For Biden to live up to his promises to reduce U.S. emissions sharply in coming years, transition to electric vehicles and eliminate the carbon footprint of the power sector by 2035, his administration needs a helping hand from Congress.

The infrastructure package, which the Senate approved in a 69-to-30 vote with the support of 19 Senate Republicans, apportions billions of dollars for building new transmission lines, public transit and electric-car charging stations.

Meanwhile, the separate $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill, which Democrats plan to pass on their own, includes more far-reaching provisions for tackling climate change.

That measure would impose new import fees on polluters and give tax breaks for wind turbines, solar panels and electric vehicles. It would also seek to electrify vehicles used by the U.S. Postal Service and other federal agencies and create a new Civilian Climate Corps to enlist young people in planting trees and other conservation work.

Perhaps most crucially, the legislation would put new requirements on electricity providers to use cleaner forms of energy — something President Barack Obama’s administration tried but failed to do.

Dan Lashof, U.S. director of the World Resources Institute, called Tuesday’s bipartisan infrastructure package “a down payment” on the fight against climate change but not nearly enough going forward. He said it is essential for the Senate to also pass the budget-reconciliation package that funds a broader array of climate-focused measures to create jobs and shift the nation’s infrastructure toward one no longer reliant on fossil fuels.

“The forthcoming reconciliation package could be our best opportunity for advancing climate action this decade,” he said. “Kicking the can down the road is no longer an option as extreme weather wreaks havoc across our nation and around the world.”

Passing both bills, along with tighter regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency, “puts us within shooting distance” reducing emissions by 50 percent by 2030, according to Collin O’Mara, president of the National Wildlife Federation.

#### Warming causes extinction – global nuclear conflagration.

Michael Klare 20. The Nation’s defense correspondent, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College, senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War”. The Nation. Jan 13 2020. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/

President Donald Trump may not accept the scientific reality of climate change, but the nation’s senior military leaders recognize that climate disruption is already underway, and they are planning extraordinary measures to prevent it from spiraling into nuclear war. One particularly worrisome scenario is if extreme drought and abnormal monsoon rains devastate agriculture and unleash social chaos in Pakistan, potentially creating an opening for radical Islamists aligned with elements of the armed forces to seize some of the country’s 150 or so nuclear weapons. To avert such a potentially cataclysmic development, the US Joint Special Operations Command has conducted exercises for infiltrating Pakistan and locating the country’s nuclear munitions. Most of the necessary equipment for such raids is already in position at US bases in the region, according to a 2011 report from the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. “It’s safe to assume that planning for the worst-case scenario regarding Pakistan’s nukes has already taken place inside the US government,” said Roger Cressey, a former deputy director for counterterrorism in Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s administrations in 2011.

Such an attack by the United States would be an act of war and would entail enormous risks of escalation, especially since the Pakistani military—the country’s most powerful institution—views the nation’s nuclear arsenal as its most prized possession and would fiercely resist any US attempt to disable it. “These are assets which are the pride of Pakistan, assets which are…guarded by a corps of 18,000 soldiers,” former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf told NBC News in 2011. The Pakistani military “is not an army which doesn’t know how to fight. This is an army that has fought three wars. Please understand that.”

A potential US military incursion in nuclear-armed Pakistan is just one example of a crucial but little-​discussed aspect of international politics in the early 21st century: how the acceleration of climate change and nuclear war planning may make those threats to human survival harder to defuse. At present, the intersections between climate change and nuclear war might not seem obvious. But powerful forces are pushing both threats toward their most destructive outcomes.

In the case of climate change, the unbridled emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is raising global temperatures to unmistakably dangerous levels. Despite growing worldwide reliance on wind and solar power for energy generation, the global demand for oil and natural gas continues to rise, and carbon emissions are projected to remain on an upward trajectory for the foreseeable future. It is highly unlikely, then, that the increase in average global temperature can be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the aspirational goal adopted by the world’s governments under the Paris Agreement in 2015, or even to 2°C, the actual goal. After that threshold is crossed, scientists agree, it will prove almost impossible to avert catastrophic outcomes, such as the collapse of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and a resulting sea level rise of 6 feet or more.

Climbing world temperatures and rising sea levels will diminish the supply of food and water in many resource-deprived areas, increasing the risk of widespread starvation, social unrest, and human flight. Global corn production, for example, is projected to fall by as much as 14 percent in a 2°C warmer world, according to research cited in a 2018 special report by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Food scarcity and crop failures risk pushing hundreds of millions of people into overcrowded cities, where the likelihood of pandemics, ethnic strife, and severe storm damage is bound to increase. All of this will impose an immense burden on human institutions. Some states may collapse or break up into a collection of warring chiefdoms—all fighting over sources of water and other vital resources.

A similar momentum is now evident in the emerging nuclear arms race, with all three major powers—China, Russia, and the United States—rushing to deploy a host of new munitions. This dangerous process commenced a decade ago, when Russian and Chinese leaders sought improvements to their nuclear arsenals and President Barack Obama, in order to secure Senate approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010, agreed to initial funding for the modernization of all three legs of America’s strategic triad, which encompasses submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers. (New START, which mandated significant reductions in US and Russian arsenals, will expire in February 2021 unless renewed by the two countries.) Although Obama initiated the modernization of the nuclear triad, the Trump administration has sought funds to proceed with their full-scale production, at an estimated initial installment of $500 billion over 10 years.

Even during the initial modernization program of the Obama era, Russian and Chinese leaders were sufficiently alarmed to hasten their own nuclear acquisitions. Both countries were already in the process of modernizing their stockpiles—Russia to replace Cold War–era systems that had become unreliable, China to provide its relatively small arsenal with enhanced capabilities. Trump’s decision to acquire a whole new suite of ICBMs, nuclear-armed submarines, and bombers has added momentum to these efforts. And with all three major powers upgrading their arsenals, the other nuclear-weapon states—led by India, Pakistan, and North Korea—have been expanding their stockpiles as well. Moreover, with Trump’s recent decision to abandon the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, all major powers are developing missile delivery systems for a regional nuclear war such as might erupt in Europe, South Asia, or the western Pacific.

All things being equal, rising temperatures will increase the likelihood of nuclear war, largely because climate change will heighten the risk of social stress, the decay of nation-states, and armed violence in general, as I argue in my new book, All Hell Breaking Loose. As food and water supplies dwindle and governments come under ever-increasing pressure to meet the vital needs of their populations, disputes over critical resources are likely to become more heated and violent, whether the parties involved have nuclear arms or not. But this danger is compounded by the possibility that several nuclear-armed powers—notably India, Pakistan, and China—will break apart as a result of climate change and accompanying battles over disputed supplies of water.

Together, these three countries are projected by the UN Population Division to number approximately 3.4 billion people in 2050, or 34 percent of the world’s population. Yet they possess a much smaller share of the world’s freshwater supplies, and climate change is destined to reduce what they have even further. Warmer temperatures are also expected to diminish crop yields in these countries, adding to the desperation of farmers and very likely resulting in widespread ethnic strife and population displacement. Under these circumstances, climate-related internal turmoil would increase the risk of nuclear war in two ways: by enabling the capture of nuclear arms by rogue elements of the military and their possible use against perceived enemies and by inciting wars between these states over vital supplies of water and other critical resources.

The risk to Pakistan from climate change is thought to be particularly acute. A large part of the population is still engaged in agriculture, and much of the best land—along with access to water—is controlled by wealthy landowners (who also dominate national politics). Water scarcity and mismanagement is a perennial challenge, and climate change is bound to make the problem worse. Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, a 2013 report by the National Research Council for the US intelligence community, highlights the danger of chaos and conflict in that country as global warming advances. Pakistan, the report notes, is expected to suffer from inadequate water supplies during the dry season and severe flooding during the monsoon—outcomes that will devastate its agriculture and amplify the poverty and unrest already afflicting much of the country. “The Pakistan case,” the report reads, “illustrates how a highly stressed environmental system on which a tense society depends can be a source of political instability and how that source can intensify when climate events put increased stress on the system.” Thus, as global temperatures rise and agriculture declines, Pakistan could shatter along ethnic, class, and religious lines, precisely the scenario that might trigger the sort of intervention anticipated by the US Joint Special Operations Command.

Assuming that Pakistan remains intact, another great danger arising from increasing world temperatures is a conflict between it and India or between China and India over access to shared river systems. Whatever their differences, Pakistan and western India are forced by geography to share a single river system, the Indus, for much of their water requirements. Likewise, western China and eastern India also share a river, the Brahmaputra, for their vital water needs. The Indus and the Brahmaputra obtain much of their flow from periods of heavy precipitation; they also depend on meltwater from Himalayan glaciers, and these are at risk of melting because of rising temperatures. According to the IPCC, the Himalayan glaciers could lose as much as 29 percent of their total mass by 2035 and 78 percent by 2100. This would produce periodic flooding as the ice melts but would eventually result in long periods of negligible flow, with calamitous consequences for downstream agriculture. The widespread starvation and chaos that could result would prove daunting to all the governments involved and make any water-related disputes between them a potential flash point for escalation.

As in Pakistan, water supply has always played a pivotal role in the social and economic life of China and India, with both countries highly dependent on a few major river systems for civic and agricultural purposes. Excessive rainfall can lead to catastrophic flooding, and prolonged drought has often led to widespread famine and mass starvation. In such a setting, water management has always been a prime responsibility of government—and a failure to fulfill this function effectively has often resulted in civil unrest. Climate change is bound to increase this danger by causing prolonged water shortages interspersed with severe flooding. This has prompted leaders of both countries to build ever more dams on all key rivers.

India, as the upstream power on several tributaries of the Indus, and China, as the upstream power on the Brahmaputra, have considered damming these rivers and diverting their waters for exclusive national use, thereby diminishing the flow to downstream users. Three of the Indus’s principal tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, and Ravi rivers, flow through Indian-controlled Kashmir (now in total lockdown, with government forces suppressing all public functions). It’s possible that India seeks full control of Kashmir in order to dam the tributaries there and divert their waters from Pakistan—a move that could easily trigger a war if it occurs at a time of severe food and water stress and one that would very likely invite the use of nuclear weapons, given Pakistan’s attitude toward them.

The situation regarding the Brahmaputra could prove equally precarious. China has already installed one dam on the river, the Zangmu Dam in Tibet, and has announced plans for several more. Some Chinese hydrologists have proposed the construction of canals linking the Brahmaputra to more northerly rivers in China, allowing the diversion of its waters to drought-stricken areas of the heavily populated northeast. These plans have yet to come to fruition, but as global warming increases water scarcity across northern China, Beijing might proceed with the idea. “If China was determined to move forward with such a scheme,” the US National Intelligence Council warned in 2009, “it could become a major element in pushing China and India towards an adversarial rather than simply a competitive relationship.”

Severe water scarcity in northern China could prompt yet another move with nuclear implications: an attempted annexation by China of largely uninhabited but water-rich areas of Russian Siberia. Thousands of Chinese farmers and merchants have already taken up residence in eastern Siberia, and some commentators have spoken of a time when climate change prompts a formal Chinese takeover of those areas—which would almost certainly prompt fierce Russian resistance and the possible use of nuclear weapons.

In the Arctic, global warming is producing a wholly different sort of peril: geopolitical competition and conflict made possible by the melting of the polar ice cap. Before long, the Arctic ice cap is expected to disappear in summertime and to shrink noticeably in the winter, making the region more attractive for resource extraction. According to the US Geological Survey, an estimated 30 percent of the world’s remaining undiscovered natural gas is above the Arctic Circle; vast reserves of iron ore, uranium, and rare earth minerals are also thought to be buried there. These resources, along with the appeal of faster commercial shipping routes linking Europe and Asia, have induced all the major powers, including China, to establish or expand operations in the region. Russia has rehabilitated numerous Arctic bases abandoned after the Cold War and built others; the United States has done likewise, modernizing its radar installation at Thule in Greenland, reoccupying an airfield at Keflavík in Iceland, and establishing bases in northern Norway.

Increased economic and military competition in the Arctic has significant nuclear implications, as numerous weapons are deployed there and geography lends it a key role in many nuclear scenarios. Most of Russia’s missile-carrying submarines are based near Murmansk, on the Barents Sea (an offshoot of the Arctic Ocean), and many of its nuclear-armed bombers are also at bases in the region to take advantage of the short polar route to North America. As a counterweight, the Pentagon has deployed additional subs and antisubmarine aircraft near the Barents Sea and interceptor aircraft in Alaska, followed by further measures by Moscow. “I do not want to stoke any fears here,” Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in June 2017, “but experts are aware that US nuclear submarines remain on duty in northern Norway…. We must protect [Russia’s] shore accordingly.”

On the other side of the equation, an intensifying arms race will block progress against climate change by siphoning resources needed for a global energy transition and by poisoning the relations among the great powers, impeding joint efforts to slow the warming.

With the signing of the Paris Agreement, it appeared that the great powers might unite in a global effort to slash greenhouse gas emissions quickly enough to avoid catastrophe, but those hopes have since receded. At the time, Obama emphasized that limiting global warming would require nations to work together in an environment of trust and peaceful cooperation. Instead of leading the global transition to a postcarbon energy system, however, the major powers are spending massively to enhance their military capabilities and engaging in conflict-provoking behaviors.

Since fiscal year 2016, the annual budget of the US Department of Defense has risen from $580 billion to $738 billion in fiscal year 2020. When the budget increases for each fiscal year since 2016 are combined, the United States will have spent an additional $380 billion on military programs by the end of this fiscal year—more than enough to jump-start the transition to a carbon-​free economy. If the Pentagon budget rises as planned to $747 billion in fiscal year 2024, a total of $989 billion in additional spending will have been devoted to military operations and procurement over this period, leaving precious little money for a Green New Deal or any other scheme for systemic decarbonization.

Meanwhile, policy-makers in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow increasingly regard one another as implacable and dangerous adversaries. “As China and Russia seek to expand their global influence,” then–Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats informed Congress in a January 2019 report, “they are eroding once well-established security norms and increasing the risk of regional conflicts.” Chinese and Russian officials have been making similar statements about the United States. Secondary powers like India, Pakistan, and Turkey are also assuming increasingly militaristic postures, facilitating the potential spread of nuclear weapons and exacerbating regional tensions. In this environment, it is almost impossible to imagine future climate negotiations at which the great powers agree on concrete measures for a rapid transition to a clean energy economy.

In a world constantly poised for nuclear war while facing widespread state decay from climate disruption, these twin threats would intermingle and intensify each other. Climate-​related resource stresses and disputes would increase the level of global discord and the risk of nuclear escalation; the nuclear arms race would poison relations between states and make a global energy transition impossible.

## DIB

#### Alt causes to DIB decline – injecting competition can’t solve.

Hallman 20 (Wesley Hallman, regulatory policy associate at NDIA, 1/21/2020 “Vital Signs 2020: Defense Industrial Base’s Report Card Reveals ‘C’ Grade,” National Defense. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/1/21/vital-signs-2020-defense-industrial-bases-report-card-reveals-c-grade//KDES).

This year’s mediocre “C” grade reflects a business environment characterized by highly contrasting areas of concern and confidence. Deteriorating conditions in 2020 for industrial security and for the availability and cost of skilled labor and materials emerge from this analysis as areas of clear concern. Favorable conditions for competition in the defense contracting market, and rising demand for defense goods and services reflect recent year-over-year growth in the defense budget. This first of an expected annual study contributes to the debate about national defense acquisition strategy by offering a common set of indicators — vital signs — of what some have called America’s “sixth service,” the industrial partners providing our warfighters their capability advantages. To do this assessment, we conducted a months-long study of data from eight different dimensions shaping the performance capabilities of defense contractors including: market competition; demand for defense goods and services; cost and availability of skilled labor and critical materials; investment and productivity in the U.S. national innovation system; threats to industrial security; supply chain performance; industrial surge capacity; and political and regulatory activity. We analyzed over 40 longitudinal statistical indicators, converting each into an index score on a scale of 0 (bad) to 100 (excellent). We did this over a three-year running average to control for data spikes such as last year’s government shutdown. Last, we aggregated the individual indicatorscores into scores for each dimension, and into an overall composite score for the defense industrial base with 2020 scoring at 77, a passing C grade but with a worrying downward trend. A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generatedThe analysis reveals a stressed defense industrial base, trending negative. Composite scores for four of eight dimensions eroded in 2019. And, six dimensions earned composite scores lower than 80, C or worse, and two dimensions earned scores below 70, failing grades. For a sector facing “unprecedented” challenges, these scores suggest a defense industrial base increasingly struggling to meet them. Industrial security scored 64 for 2019, the lowest among the eight dimensions. Industrial security has gained prominence as massive data breaches and brazen acts of economic espionage by state and non-state actors plagued defense contractors in recent years. To assess industrial security conditions, we analyzed indicators of threats to information security and threats to intellectual property rights. The indicators of global information security threats were already failing in 2017 and went even lower in 2019. This score incorporates the rising annual average number of new cyber vulnerabilities documented by MITRE Corp., which almost doubled between 2016 and 2018 when compared to 2014-2016. The score also incorporates MITRE’s annual average of the threat severity of new cyber vulnerabilities, which improved slightly for 2016-2018, but remains high. In contrast, intellectual property rights threats scored 100 out of 100 for 2019, the result of new FBI investigations into IP rights violations, which have been steadily declining since peaking in 2011. Defense industry production inputs also scored poorly in 2019, down from a barely passing 70 in 2017. Major production inputs include skilled labor, intermediate goods and services, and raw materials used to manufacture or develop end-products and services for Defense Department consumption. Relatively low 2019 index scores for defense industry workforce size helped drive the low score for this dimension. The estimate of the size of the defense industry workforce, currently about 1.1 million, falls substantially below its mid-1980s peak size of 3.2 million. Security clearance process indicators also contributed to the low overall composite score for production inputs as backlogs shrink but persist. Onboarding new personnel in the defense industry often requires navigating the security clearance process. Contractors face a security clearance management process that worsened between 2017 and 2019. The index scores for the annual average number of pending security clearance investigations declined for 2019 with much of that decrease due to issues with initial top-secret clearances.

#### No impact – pentagon stopgap solves.

Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Do U.S. Defense Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?,” *Forbes*, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-u-s-defense-firms-really-need-arms-exports/#2eeb1e7c63eb, Accessed 06-24-2019)

Is this just another case of Trumpian exaggeration, aimed at portraying him as a master deal maker who can bring good jobs to America in general and the heartland in particular, or is there more to it? There’s no question that particular companies benefit from Saudi sales. The bulk of the more than $150 billion in U.S. arms offers to Riyadh since 2009 have involved four of America’s top five defense contractors – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and General Dynamics – in deals that have involved everything from combat aircraft to tanks to missile defense systems to armored vehicles to combat ships. The most controversial deals have involved precision-guided munitions that have been used by Saudi Arabia in its brutal war in Yemen, which has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. And all of these firms are seeking to grow their export markets, both to increase profits and to provide insurance against the ups and downs of the Pentagon procurement budget. But the truth of the matter is that U.S. firms could do without sales to Saudi Arabia and other repressive regimes, and they’d still be doing just fine financially. The current Pentagon budget is at one of the highest levels since World War II, and it provides ample funding for procurement and R&D, much of which lands in the coffers of major defense firms that are the leading weapons exporters. This is particularly true when one considers that the most likely outcome would not be a total ban on sales to Saudi Arabia, but a prohibition on weapons most relevant to the Yemen war – precision-guided munitions in particular. Other deals, like a lucrative $15 billion sale of the Lockheed Martin THAAD missile defense system to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems and combat aircraft exported to allies in Europe and Asia, not bombs being used in war zones.

Not read)

#### DIB causes endless war and not key to deterrence.

Gorkowski 17 (Justin Gorkowski, major in the US Army with experience as a combat engineer and information operations officer. 1-19-2017, “Reassessing Ike’s Warning: The Acquisition of Unwarranted Influence,” Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/reassessing-ikes-warning-acquisition-unwarranted-influence//KDES).

The link between US foreign policy and the domestic economy is stronger than ever. As an example, Israel—the largest recipient of US foreign military assistance, is required to spend a certain percentage of these assistance funds on US companies. This seems like a good thing—unless domestic economic concerns begin to influence foreign policy decisions. This risk may be more of a reality than we think. The defense contracting industry has provided the US government options for every type of warfare imaginable since the development of the War Industries Board during World War I —from intelligence analysis to nuclear warhead components. Lobbyists for the defense industry work tirelessly to inform Congress of scalable effects they can provide to influence actions abroad and policy at home. After all, business for the defense industry at some point equates to jobs in a congressional district. The 9/11 attacks served as a catalyst to the outsourcing of defense contracts like never before. From 2002 to 2012, the combined revenue of the five largest US defense contractors grew from $2.4 billion to $13.4 billion when adjusted for inflation. For many members of Congress, domestic concerns such as employment are often more important than foreign policy. This is especially true for the 64 percent of Congress not currently serving on defense authorization, appropriations, state and foreign operations, intelligence, or foreign relations committees. In truth, Congress has become heavily reliant upon the defense industry and think tanks for national security assessments to balance out the executive branch perspective. The defense industry nearly plays as much of a role in shaping congressional opinion on defense policy as the Pentagon. The defense industry is increasingly a driving force behind US foreign policy and decreasing congressional influence on actions abroad. The risk is that foreign policy will be based disproportionately on industry profits, which are fundamentally tied to war or the perceived threat of war. Policy Mechanisms of Influence The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. . . . We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. — Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961 The calculus used by the defense industry to influence policy is robust and constantly evolving. Some of the most effective mechanisms are those that invoke an emotional response among groups of individuals. A few of the most common mechanisms for industry influence are outlined below. Threat Inflation The defense industry works relentlessly to clarify national security threats to Congress and the ability of their companies to address the problem. Threat inflation makes good business sense. The concept is not new. As military spending escalated during the Cold War, the quest for parity with Soviet capabilities and aspirations remained a constant tool for defense industry and congressional manipulation. In the 1950s, the discovery of a “bomber gap,” and the subsequent “missile gap,” was leveraged to suggest that the American way of life was at significant risk. The trend continues today. Think tanks such as RAND, AEI, and the Heritage Foundation paint a dim picture of US ability to deter Russian aggression. In 2016, Western European defense expenditures rose for the first time in six years. However, as pressure to contribute financially to the collective defense of NATO mounts, member countries increasingly question the true value of their membership. Interestingly, Russia’s budget for 2016 included the first reduction in defense expenditures since the late 1990s. Political Engineering The defense industry has carefully crafted business to maximize congressional interest. The new Ford-class aircraft carrier is built of parts that are made in 330 of 435 congressional districts and forty-five states. These parts equate to jobs and advocacy among middle-class Huntington Ingalls employees and families all across the country. This reality makes it difficult for members of Congress to argue against the construction of new aircraft carriers, despite the fact they cost $12.3 billion each and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. John McCain has labeled the program a “national disgrace.” Lockheed Martin took the concept of political engineering a step further in the plan for the F-35, adding nine foreign countries to the list of production sites. The F-35 supports 133,000 jobs in the United States alone. When production rates begin to slow, Congress is faced with the dilemma of keeping defense businesses operational (M1A1 Abrams factory in Lima, Ohio, Boeing in St Louis). There is currently an industry–utility lag in the Defense Department that serves as a major inhibitor to defense spending reductions and budgeting. In some cases, if needs are not current (or recommended by DoD), Congress works with industry to find ways to keep the doors open. This is tantamount to saying to the services, “I know you didn’t ask for these airplanes, but we’re going to give you them anyway.” Although reconstituting businesses and experience for more copies of the same platform in the future will cost time and money, DoD should not be responsible for industry growth and maintenance. Such efforts may actually hinder innovation. Advocate Placement If an individual works in DC long enough, he or she is likely to get caught in the revolving door. Movements from industry to congressional staff and from the executive branch to industry are commonplace and further complicate congressional perspective. The defense contractor MPRI likes to say that they have “more generals per square foot here than at the Pentagon.” DoD officials have unique knowledge of how to request specific platforms, supplies, or munitions and the ability to impress upon Congress the vital nature of those requests. President Obama signed an Executive Order in 2011 to address the revolving door, but movements remain difficult to track. Additionally, reform initiatives within DoD add pressure to recruit the best and brightest and revolving door laws are perceived by some to be too stringent. What stronger advocate could the defense industry have than an experienced service member demanding from Congress funding for critical resources? Advocate placement is nothing new from a lobbying perspective. Lobbying firms do their best to recruit strong advocates every day. Staffers and members alike move to and from lobbying firms and keep the door revolving. However, recognition and placement of key personnel in the defense industry coalition is something that is unparalleled in any other industry. Consequences Through the use of the mechanisms listed above, in addition to many others, money is appropriated and policies are authorized that may not be synchronized to effectively address the current threats to US national security. In an effort to responsibly address the national debt, the Budget Control Act was passed in 2011, which put spending caps on both defense and non-defense spending. As a result, sequestration went into effect, which ultimately forced all branches of the military to make some hard decisions. Orders on major weapons systems scaled down and cuts to military personnel were deemed necessary to meet the budgetary constraints. However, even under current fiscal constraints, industry prevails.

#### No cyber impact.

Lewis '20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

#### Won’t go nuclear.

Tucker ’18 [February 2, 2018 Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/02/no-us-wont-respond-cyber-attack-nukes/145700/]

The idea that the U.S. is building new low-yield nuclear weapons to respond to a cyber attack is “not true,” military leaders told reporters in the runup to the Friday release of the new Nuclear Posture Review.

“The people who say we lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons are saying, ‘but we want these low-yield nuclear weapons so that we can answer a cyber attack because we’re so bad at cyber security.’ That’s just fundamentally not true,” Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday at a meeting with reporters.

It’s an idea that military leaders have been pushing back against since the New York Times ran a Jan. 16 story headlined, “Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks With Nuclear Arms.”

When would the U.S. launch a nuclear attack in response to a non-nuclear event? The Defense Department says the threshold hasn’t changed since the Obama administration’s own nuclear posture review in 2010, but a draft of the new review that leaked online caused a bit of drama in its attempts to dispel “ambiguity.”

The new review gives examples of “non-nuclear strategic attacks,” Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy, told reporters on Thursday. “It could be catastrophic attacks against civilian populations, against infrastructure. It could be an attack using a non-nuclear weapon against our nuclear command-and-control [or] early-warning satellites. But we don’t talk about cyber.”

In his own conversation with reporters, Selva broadened “early warning” systems to include ones that provide “indications of warning that are important to our detection of an attack.” He also emphasized, “We never said ‘cyber.’”

There’s a reason for that. While cyber attacks on physical infrastructure can be very dangerous, they are unlikely to kill enough people to provoke a U.S. nuclear response.

An National Academies of Science and Engineering analysis of the vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure makes that point. A major cyber attack could cut off electrical power, resulting in “people dying from heat or cold exposure, etc.,” said Granger Morgan, co-director of the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center and one of the chairs of the report.  “A large outage of long duration could cover many states and last for weeks or longer. Whether and how many casualties there could be would depend on things like what the weather was during the outage.”

It’s a huge problem but not an event resulting in tens of thousands of immediate deaths.

Contrast that with a nuclear attack on a city like Moscow, even one using a device of 6 kilotons, much smaller than the ones the United States used against Japanese targets in World War II. The immediate result: there would be 40,000 deaths, according to the online nuclear simulation tool NukeMap.

Russia has demonstrated a willingness to take down power services with cyber attacks, as they did in Ukraine on Christmas Eve 2015. But these attacks were brief and occured in the context of actual fighting.

In other words, the worst cyber physical attack that top experts believe credible likely does not meet the threshold that the Defense Department has set out for deploying a nuclear weapon.

## Hegemony

#### Supremacy creates precipitous conditions for miscalculation. Power transitions wars are unlikely because parity is a destination, not a midway point.

Jared Morgan McKinney, Professor of IR @ Nanyang Tech (Singapore), ‘19, How to avoid a contest for supremacy in East Asia, Comparative Strategy, 38:4, 316-326,

A second discourse framework also emerged around the time of the pivot to Asia: the so-called Contest for Supremacy currently said to be underway in Asia between China and the United States.4 This essay contends that such a contest is based on a faulty theory of international relations and will create the very conditions in which hegemonic war is most likely. Strategists and military officers should stop thinking in terms of hegemonic competition to be number one and restore a forgotten tradition described by adjectives such as balance, parity, equilibrium, and stability.

Power transition theory and American grand strategy

The frame of a contest for supremacy, the increasingly dominant way to conceive of Sino American rivalry, is based (even if often subliminally5 ) on power transition theory (PTT). At the heart of this theory is the belief that there is a “dominant power” that hierarchically structures international systems, and that war becomes probable when an unsatisfied rising power approaches, or transcends, the power capability of the dominant power.6 As constituted by its authors, PTT proposed a twofold theory of peace: avoid parity or satisfy the rising power’s ambitions.7 The essential proposition of PTT—that parity comes with many dangers—has been today restated prominently by Graham Allison under the moniker “Thucydides” trap.”

Within America’s grand strategy discourse, there have been two prevailing “solutions” to the prospect of a rising China disturbing the repose of the United States, the world’s dominant state or “unipole.” The first, traditionally called “liberalism,” has been to “socialize” and integrate China into the U.S.-led system.9 The most important stage in this process was for China to gradually become democratic. The various means to achieve this end—e.g., free trade, industrialization, or the rise of a middle class—differed, but all reflected forms of “modernization” theory descended from Enlightenment thought.10 Liberalism complemented, and did not contradict, the second “solution,” which was simply to prevent power parity. This has typically gone by the name “balancing” 11 and it has been unambiguously included in America’s National Defense/ Security Strategies since at least the early 1990s.12

Both responses are increasingly seen as inadequate.13 China’s refusal to be socialized into America’s system has “defied” the expectations of liberals.14 Meanwhile, balancers increasingly warn that China is likely not just to reach parity with the U.S., but to surpass it in Asia.15 In consequence of the failure of the two “solutions” to China’s rise, fear is increasingly becoming the driving emotion behind America’s strategic disposition in the Indo-Pacific. What the U.S. fears is perfectly clear. In the words of noted Asia scholar Lowell Dittmer, “America’s Asia is becoming China’s Asia.”

16 This fear is widely held.17 Insofar as a strategist accepts the theoretical assumption that the international system is hierarchical and constituted by the rise and fall of dominant/ hegemonic states,18 this fear is warranted. Historical evidence indicates that war becomes more likely in conditions of power parity,19 and a world without U.S. dominance is likely to be more illiberal in noticeable ways.20 So much for the better angels of our nature.21 Given this dilemma, America’s new consensus is that it is time for the U.S. to “get tough” and to “stand up” to China.22 That this requires unlearning the lessons of the First World War (i.e., the danger of inadvertent escalation) is simply a cost to be paid in the quest to win the contest for supremacy.23 If the choice is either to compete in Asia to maintain America’s hegemony or to cravenly leave24 for the sake of peace—surrendering it to the Chinese—only the first option realistically matches America’s (supposedly) deeply rooted attachment to the region25 and deepseated phobia of appeasement.26 Honest balancers, such as John Mearsheimer, acknowledge that staying in the region to compete for hegemony comes with a very serious risk of major-power war. Even if neither side sought intentionally to cause such a war, the “lessons” of the First World War suggest that competitive risk-taking can occasionally get out of hand, and a great war—neither quite intentional nor quite accidental—can materialize.27 What should be “almost unthinkable” in an age of nuclear weapons28 remains quite possible, for, as the annals of history demonstrate, political leaders are not consistently “prudent, enlightened, far-sighted, and peaceloving.” 29 Far from coolly calculating interests, leaders are well known to act intuitively and emotionally,30 to choose war even when it is “materially inefficient,” 31 to prefer catastrophic defeat to humiliation,32 to be obsessed with national prestige,33 and to fight for status.34 This is the “stuff” of international politics, and anyone who blindly implies the contrary has not seriously grappled either with the historical record or the ever-growing body of scholarship on the many paths to war.35

Risking major-power war may make sense if the only alternative is U.S. dominance or Chinese dominance.36 But this is a false dichotomy. In fact, PTT is fundamentally flawed both conceptually and historically. Conceptually, the theory ignores the obvious possibility that approximate parity can be a destination just as well as it can be a mere waypoint. Making international politics about “supremacy” is as likely to create a contest for supremacy as it is to describe one. Historically, PTT vastly overstates the evidence supposedly in its favor. Hegemonic wars do take place.37 However, such wars seem to require certain structural conditions. These include the emergence of technologies that can give certain states a large lead, the existence of powerful enabling ideologies (e.g., monotheism38 or Nazism39) and the material significance of land and mass labor in generating wealth and power.40 That being said, PTT’s most common illustrations for “hegemonic war”—the Peloponnesian War and the First World War—only support the theory in the vaguest of manners. In 431, Athens can be said to have acted from hubris and Sparta from honor;41 in 1914, Russia—not Germany—was seen as the rising and unstoppable colossus.42 In both cases, war developed out of a confluence of international structures, the actions of allies/clients, and chance. It is far from clear that the theory of “hegemonic war” actually explains anything about these cases.43

More to the point, the Long Nineteenth Century (1815–1914), which witnessed, in the words of Karl Polanyi, “a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization, namely, a hundred years’ peace,” 44 is the best example of parity as a destination. The old canard that the century’s peace rested on “British hegemony,” despite its continuing repetition in the IR literature,45 can no longer be seriously held.46 To the contrary, it resulted from a special form of the balance of power, which Richard Little has theorized as an “associative balance” 47 and Paul Schroeder has called “shared hegemony.” 48 This associative balance was intentionally constructed upon a territorial settlement that satisfied the basic needs of the system’s major powers.49 This “formally instituted” peace was maintained through an intricate system of diplomacy called the Concert of Europe.50 The point, which need not be prolonged here, is that there is a conceptually and historically extant alternative to the contest for supremacy, and that this alternative is partially responsible for the most peaceful century in modern European history. This, one would think, would be worthy of serious contemporary attention.

#### Power parity creates strategic stability that prevents nuclear war. China revisionism operates continuously, not discretely. (not read)

Jared Morgan McKinney, Professor of IR @ Nanyang Tech (Singapore), ‘19, How to avoid a contest for supremacy in East Asia, Comparative Strategy, 38:4, 316-326,

Comparative Strategy was founded to help the U.S. triumph in a quest for supremacy with a “traditional imperial international order based on a totalitarian political-system.” The struggle, as the journal’s founding editor then characterized it, had been long in the making, but had been enabled by “the final breakup of the European colonial system after World War II” which had “left a vacuum” that the USSR was “moving to fill.”

71 The contrast was between an America whose “conquests are made with the plowshare,” and a Russia whose conquests were made “with the sword.” The one stood for international “freedom,” the other, international “servitude.” 72 A principal objection to any call for abandoning America’s strategy of dominance in Asia is that China is replicating the USSR’s former quest for supremacy. China is not going to be satisfied with balance, parity, or equilibrium: it wants what America fears, dominance. China’s “revisionist” territorial ambitions in the region are generally submitted as the proof for this proposition. The trouble with this move is that it treats the category “revisionist” as if it were discrete (yes or no) when it is actually continuous.

73 The vital point is not whether a state is committed to modifying some aspects of the existing order, but which aspects and to what extent. The vast majority of China specialists, across the entire ideological spectrum, agree that China’s territorial ambitions are limited, derived from (perceived) historical inequities, and tied to popular legitimization.74 Contrary to much rhetoric, China has never clarified the nature of the claims implied by the Nine-Dashed Line.75 A reasonable way to interpret the ambiguity is to think of it as a bargaining tactic: China has “padded” its position in order to improve its ability to negotiate the claims.76 Importantly, this implies China, though surely a tough actor, is willing to accept an eventual compromise settlement. Other than the territorial issues, there are a few points of exasperation with other (perceived) inequities in the international system,77 but China’s overall approach has been to seek gradual reform through legitimate means.78 In short: China is neither a modern equivalent to the expansionist and imperialist Soviet Union nor the revolutionary and totalitarian China of the Mao years.79 Just as importantly, there is no “vacuum” in Asia today.80 To the contrary, the states of the region are prosperous, relatively stable, and increasingly armed with area-denial weapons.81 Neither the context of contemporary international politics in Asia nor the nature of the contemporary Chinese state indicate a quest for supremacy is imperative or inevitable.

Even if this is so, what about the claim that even China’s limited ambitions conflict with vital American interests? The “national interest,” like the “public interest,” is a contested concept.82 Nonetheless, generally “vital” interests are considered those necessary for America’s survival and flourishing. A common attempt to meet this standard is to talk about the amount of commerce that travels through the South China Sea (allegedly around $5 trillion) and then to suggest that China’s territorial claims and interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty (UNCLOS) threatens this trade. But this argument fails to convince: the vast majority of this commerce is going to or from China. Furthermore, shipping density maps indicate that most of the commerce not being routed through China is coast hugging and already outside China’s Nine-Dashed Line. So even if China did interfere with commerce within the NineDashed Line—something not even a scintilla of evidence suggests is likely—it would be principally its own commerce it was upsetting.83 China committing economic suicide is hardly a violation of an American “vital” interest! The “magical” discourse about a “rules-based order” in East Asia is about geopolitics, not economics.84

As for Taiwan, geostrategists tend to argue that the island forms an essential part of what Nicholas Spykman called East Asia’s “maritime periphery” and what today is generally called the “first island chain.” 85 If the U.S. were to back off from actively propping up the ROC regime, the danger is less that Taiwan would be conquered—in fact, Taiwan has an extensive capability to inflict extreme pain on an invader86—and more that it would let Chinese naval forces, particularly ballistic missile submarines, transit into the blue waters of the Western Pacific. Such transiting is necessary because China’s Jin-Class SSBNs have to travel approximately 4,000 kms east in order to be in range of the continental U.S.87 This, however, can be seen as a feature rather than a bug. China’s nuclear force is currently potentially vulnerable to an American first-strike.88 There is some evidence China is moving from a minimum to a limited deterrence posture,89 but it is still a long way from accomplishing this. For the time being, there is a real possibility China could be pushed into a “use or lose” situation, i.e., the most destabilizing and escalatory of strategic scenarios.90 A geopolitical situation that permitted China’s ballistic missile submarines to break out of the first island chain could help restore and preserve strategic stability. Arms races and rapid technological innovations create conditions where even a solid nuclear deterrent could be undermined;91 today, this is even truer of China’s small arsenal. In an age of nuclear weapons, Spykman’s “maritime periphery” may simply be too good of a barrier, one which suggests the strategic paradox: “nothing fails like success.”

Conclusion

At some point in the coming generation, it is highly likely—indeed, effectively certain—that the developing contest for supremacy will result in serious crises that will threaten the United States, China, and Asia with the prospect of major war. Whether such a war would go nuclear is now simply one question among many, for this is an age in which potential domains of conflict are expanding, and certainly include space, cyber, and the geo-economic.92 If war does result from these crises, historians will likely look back upon the contest for supremacy with critical eyes, wondering why all of the intelligence of the modern age still allowed the strategic situation to be framed by a false dichotomy (dominance or subservience). If war does not result, that will be the moment in which a shift in U.S. policy will become the most conceivable; the moment when the false certitudes of PTT and the quest for supremacy are cast aside, and—for the sake of peace—a new policy of cautious equilibrium is articulated. It took one hundred years for the Abbe de Saint-Pierre’s ideas to bear fruit. It can only be hoped that the delay is not, this time, so long.

# 2NC

## Regulate CP

### 2NC – OV

#### Energy and aerospace companies agree that the counterplan solves

NSSO 7 (October 2007, National Security Space Office, “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security,” www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/.../final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf , FS)

The SBSP Study Group found that a small amount of entry capital by the US Government is likely to catalyze substantially more investment by the private sector.

This opinion was expressed many times over from energy and aerospace companies alike. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that even the activity of this interim study has already provoked significant activity by at least three major aerospace companies. Should the United States put some dollars in for a study or demonstration, it is likely to catalyze significant amounts of internal research and development. Study leaders likewise heard that the DoD could have a catalytic role by sponsoring prizes or signaling its willingness to become the anchor customer for the product.

These findings are consistent with the findings of the recent President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report which recommended the federal government “expand its role as an early adopter in order to demonstrate commercial feasibility of advanced energy technologies.”

## Biz Con

#### The aff’s narrow scope actually proves the link – narrow antitrust decisions create greater uncertainty about future application of rules, which chills pro-competitive conduct

Broulik 19 – Jan Broulik, Emile Noël Fellow, Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, New York University School of Law, “Preventing Anticompetitive Conduct Directly and Indirectly: Accuracy Versus Predictability,” *The Antitrust Bulletin*, Volume 64, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 115-127

The indirect mechanism, in contrast, attaches no intrinsic negative value to an error per se. What matters instead are expectations held by businesses that their conduct might be falsely convicted or acquitted in the future.36 It is not possible, however, to simply associate expectations of false convictions with deterrence of procompetitive conduct and expectations of false acquittals with non-deterrence of anticompetitive conduct. This is because the deterrent effect depends on the difference between the sanction expected for engaging in procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct, and the probabilities of both false convictions and acquittals influence this difference.37

Despite the differences between the mechanisms, accuracy enhances effectiveness of both. Ceteris paribus, antitrust designers should therefore always strive for more and more accurate adjudication.

IV. Predictability

Another property of antitrust adjudication is its predictability, often also called certainty.38 Voigt and Schmidt define it as the businesses’ capacity to make predictions concerning the adjudicative assessment of their conduct that have a high chance of turning out to be correct.39 Note that predictability is conceptually independent of accuracy—adjudicative decisions may be predictable or unpredictable regardless of whether they are accurate or erroneous.40

A. Predictability and Differentiation

The more differentiated an antitrust rule is, the more difficult it is to predict the outcomes of its application.41 Consider, for example, Hawk and Denaeijer’s view: “An analysis of the competitive effects (benefits and harms) of a practice necessarily introduces some legal uncertainty. It is probably fair to say that the more refined/robust the inquiry into the actual competitive effects and justifications of a practice, the greater the uncertainty.”42 Bo Vesterdorf, then president of the European Court of First Instance, argues similarly that “a precise, case by case, full-blown, effects-based, economic analysis does not always go hand in hand with legal certainty.”43

Higher differentiation of antitrust rules brings about unpredictability in two ways. First, businesses may have poor information about the facts upon which the decision applying the rules is to be based. While the business decision needs to be taken before the respective practice is implemented, the adjudicative decision assessing the practice usually enjoys the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, the adjudicator has access to data generally inaccessible by the assessed business, for example, competitors’ data.44 It is then clearly possible that a business lacking the knowledge of the relevant facts arrives at a different conclusion about the lawfulness of a given practice than the adjudicator.

Second, businesses may not be sure what modeling choices adjudicators will adopt in their economic analyses. It is an often-criticized fact that several different models can regularly be used for a particular situation, all of which appear to represent the reality sufficiently well.45 If these models lead to contradictory conclusions, the question arises as to which model and conclusion should be preferred.46 If the business has no ex ante knowledge about which model will eventually be used by the adjudicator, this again limits its ability to predict.47

The issue of unpredictable adjudication based on highly differentiated rules can be rephrased as a prohibitive costliness of determination of the relevant facts. Businesses will attempt to determine the facts only if the benefits of being informed exceed the costs of gaining the information.48 If, however, the expected gain from becoming informed is lower than the price paid for the economic analysis, businesses will prefer to stay uninformed.49

B. Predictability and the Two Mechanisms

Predictability of adjudication does not have bearing on effectiveness of both preventive mechanisms. The ability of businesses to predict future decisions of antitrust adjudicators matters only as long as the law aims at influencing the conduct of the businesses by the prospect of these future decisions. This ability is therefore immaterial for direct prevention of anticompetitive conduct, which only requires businesses to react to an individualized infringement decision after they learn about it.

The indirect mechanism, in contrast, requires that businesses be informed ex ante. Since effectiveness of deterrence is based on expectations of businesses about future adjudicative decisions, it hinges upon predictability.50 If businesses are unable to know whether their conduct would eventually end up convicted and sanctioned, they may be prevented from procompetitive practices as well as not prevented from anticompetitive ones.51 Unpredictable adjudication therefore reduces effectiveness of the indirect mechanism.

#### The threat created by the plan will be perceived as encouraging over-caution in other industries—also answers the “no link” arg above

Crews 19 – Clyde Wayne Crews, VP for policy & director of technology studies at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, “The Case against Antitrust Law,” 4/16/19, https://cei.org/studies/the-case-against-antitrust-law/

The issue has taken on greater urgency, as populist politicians from both left and right push for more aggressive antitrust enforcement. Regulators in the United States and the European Union have expressed an interest in pursuing antitrust actions against tech giants known as the FAANG companies— Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google. President Trump has specifically singled out Facebook, Google, and Amazon as antitrust targets. Entire business models, such as franchising, are at risk from potential antitrust regulation.

The mere threat of legal penalties—and the environment of over-caution it engenders—also has a chilling effect on entrepreneurs who want to try new business practices and innovate. Such opportunity costs are impossible to measure.

Few large antitrust cases have been brought in the United States recently, and overall enforcement activity has been slower than in previous eras, but there is a large pool of potential cases that populist politicians are interested in pursuing.

#### Err neg – enforcement actions have subtle over-deterrence effects and it’s better to err on the side of less regulation

Auer 18 – Dick Auer, Senior Fellow, International Center for Law & Economics, “Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics: Topic 4: Antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard,” FTC Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_comments/2018/10/ftc-2018-0074-d-0071-155999.pdf

One of the important lessons of economics in antitrust is that economic tools are uniquely capable (although still imperfectly so) of distinguishing competitive from anticompetitive conduct — the perennial challenge of (non-cartel) antitrust enforcement and adjudication. Non-economic evidence (so-called “hot docs,” for example) can be counter-productive and can obscure rather than illuminate the competitive significance of challenged conduct. A rigorous adherence to economic principles and economic reasoning is essential if antitrust enforcers are to ensure that their interventions actu-ally benefit consumers.

Thus, a necessary corollary to reliance on the consumer welfare standard in antitrust cases is that an evidence-based approach rooted in error-cost analysis is crucial. Particularly in innovative markets where unfamiliar business strategies are attempted, and the relative knowledge of regulators and enforcers is low, it is critical to hew to an evidence-led, error-cost approach to antitrust evaluation.57

The error-cost framework in antitrust originates with Easterbrook’s seminal analysis,58 itself built on twin premises: first, that false positives in enforcement are more costly than false negatives because self-correction mechanisms mitigate the latter but not the former; and second, that errors of both types are inevitable, because distinguishing procompetitive conduct from anticompetitive conduct is an inherently difficult task.59

A key virtue of employing the error-cost framework is that it helps to avoid the bias of economists, who frequently fail to conduct their analyses in a realistic institutional setting and avoid incorporating the social costs of erroneous enforcement decisions into their recommendations for legal rules.

Antitrust over-deterrence is not costless — the losses from erroneously deterred innovative business practices may be unseen, but they function as a drag on society nonetheless. The goal of the error-cost approach is optimal enforcement that errs on the side of permitting innovative practices that might otherwise be difficult to square under existing antitrust rules.

#### The plan creates an abrupt shift and doctrinal instability in antitrust that spills over throughout the economy---it’s impossible to distinguish specific industries because, unlike regulation, it’s enforced in generalist common law

Rogerson 20 – William Rogerson, Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of Economics at Northwestern University, Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the California Institute of Technology, and Dr. Howard Shelanski, Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Berkeley, Professor of Law at Georgetown University and Partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, JD from the UC Berkeley School of Law, BA from Haverford College, Former Clerk for Judge Stephen F. Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, Former Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission, Former Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission and Senior Economist for the President’s Council of Economic Advisers at the White House, “Antitrust Enforcement, Regulation, and Digital Platforms”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1911, June 2020, Lexis

I. GOING BEYOND ADJUDICATION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Antitrust statutes are primarily enforced in court, usually through the adjudication of specific cases or settlement against the backdrop of court-made antitrust doctrine. Indeed, despite statutory authority for the FTC to issue competition rules, and despite the technical complexity of many antitrust cases, antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States has evolved primarily through precedent developed by generalist courts, not specialized agencies. 18To be sure, the Department of Justice and the FTC influence policy through the investigations they pursue and the consent decrees they reach with parties. The FTC itself adjudicates some cases, although it does so largely according to law developed in the federal courts, to which parties can appeal any FTC decision. 19Academics and other commentators have also affected the evolution of antitrust in the United States, from supporting an economic, notably price-focused framework for U.S. competition policy to sparking a rethinking of that framework in contemporary debates. As the courts have absorbed such learning, antitrust doctrine has evolved over the decades through the push and pull of precedent across the United States judicial circuits, with the Supreme Court periodically stepping in to correct, clarify, or resolve differences among the lower federal courts. Commentators often cite antitrust as a rare example of "federal common law" in the U.S. system. 20

The adjudicatory model for implementing antitrust enforcement has several key attributes, which in turn have both advantages and disadvantages. We put aside for now the question of who is adjudicating--whether it be an expert tribunal or a court of general jurisdiction, for example--and focus on three characteristics of antitrust adjudication itself.

A. Case-by-Case, Fact-Specific Approach

Complexity of underlying issues aside, adjudication is well suited to settings in which applicability of the law is contingent on case-specific facts. With the exception of the limited conduct that the antitrust laws prohibit per se, courts review most business activities through a rule of reason, under which some conduct that is illegal in one set of circumstances is allowable in [\*1918] another. 21The inquiry into liability goes beyond whether particular conduct in fact occurred (which is the extent of the inquiry into conduct that is illegal per se) and extends into a balancing of the conduct's likely effects on competition. 22The more that liability is contingent on such case-specific facts, the more difficult it is to determine liability in advance of the conduct's having taken place. Adjudication typically occurs when conduct either is imminent or has already occurred, at which point the relevant facts as to the effects of the conduct are, in principle, more readily measured. 23Such "ex post" mechanisms of enforcement can reduce the risk of over-enforcement when compared to alternative approaches, like some forms of regulation, that spell out more comprehensively in advance what conduct is illegal. 24Reducing false positives, however, may or may not be a virtue--that calculation depends on the extent to which particular adjudicative institutions and processes under-enforce by allowing harmful conduct or transactions to slip through the liability screen.

B. Slow, Usually Predictable Doctrinal Development

A second attribute of the American adjudicatory process for antitrust is stability. While antitrust doctrine has occasionally swerved abruptly over the past century, the common-law process through which antitrust law has developed usually provides clear notice that a change is coming. As a recent example, the Supreme Court's shift in *Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS. Inc*. 25from per se liability to a rule of reason for resale price maintenance likely caught few observers by surprise. 26

Antitrust adjudication's stability, like its suitability for fact-dependent situations, is potentially double-edged. Antitrust jurisprudence can be slow to adjust to changes in economic learning or changes in the underlying economy that alter the effects of a particular kind of business conduct. For [\*1919] example, nearly thirty years ago the Supreme Court in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 27required that plaintiffs claiming predatory pricing show not only prices below some measure of incremental cost, but also that the defendant could recoup its losses. 28No plaintiff has prevailed in a predatory pricing case in a U.S. federal court since. 29That outcome might not be of concern were it the case that the Supreme Court's test accurately captures the incidence of predatory pricing. 30Economic research demonstrates, however, that predatory conduct does occur and does not depend on either below-cost pricing or recoupment. 31Predation is just one area in which court-made doctrine appears out of step with relevant economic facts and knowledge. To be sure, other forces could accelerate the common-law process of doctrinal development. For example, Congress could legislate changes to the scope, presumptions, and other parameters of antitrust law in ways that would immediately alter precedent and bind the courts going forward. 32 In practice, however, such intervention is rare and unlikely, making significant lags in doctrine a reality of antitrust adjudication in the courts.

C. Market-Driven Case Selection

In the United States, most adjudicative bodies do not select the cases that come before them. To be sure, courts have jurisdictional limitations that prevent them from hearing certain kinds of cases, and doctrines exist that allow courts to reject weak or poorly conceived complaints. Beyond those mechanisms, however, independent parties decide when and whether to pursue litigation as method of relief. One potential virtue of this separation between decisionmaking and case selection is that the market can drive the focus of judicial attention. Assuming the most widespread and most troublesome anticompetitive conduct will receive the greatest investment of litigation resources, that conduct will in turn receive the most adjudication and doctrinal development.

[\*1920] Unfortunately, the separation between adjudication and case selection will not necessarily lead to an efficient match between judicial attention and the most pressing antitrust violations. In practice, even conduct that is clearly prohibited can persist when offenders think detection is difficult; one only has to look at the consistently high number of civil and criminal price fixing cases that wind up in court, even though that conduct has clearly been illegal per se for nearly a century. 33The most widespread anticompetitive conduct might not therefore be the conduct most in need of doctrinal development--it can be just the opposite, as the persistence of cartels demonstrates. 34Moreover, if the courts develop doctrine that needs revisiting, but that deters the government or private plaintiffs from filing cases, 35then the market for judicial attention to antitrust conduct will not work well dynamically; once doctrine is settled, there may be no mechanism outside of legislation or regulatory intervention to drive doctrinal change. We return to this issue below.

D. Generalists versus Industry Experts

Returning to an issue we put aside earlier, who is doing the adjudication can matter for substantive outcomes. In U.S. antitrust law, that adjudication has occurred, at least ultimately, in generalist federal courts. That institutional locus might well make sense given the wide variety of conduct, industries, and factual circumstances that antitrust cases present. However, as specific industries come to pose particular challenges for antitrust enforcement, the case for more specialized enforcement decisionmakers becomes stronger. Traditionally, where detailed, industry-specific knowledge is required to make sound competition policy decisions, Congress has assigned authority over those decisions, at least in part, to industry-specific regulatory agencies. Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission has authority over competitive conduct in key financial sectors. 36The FCC has parallel authority with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over telecommunications mergers and sole authority to establish terms for competitive entry into various telecommunications markets. 37State [\*1921] regulators govern entry into hospital markets through Certifications of Public Need. 38The federal courts have increasingly safeguarded the domain of industry specific regulators over competition issues even when agency decisions might be in tension with antitrust law. 39

As antitrust enforcement focuses on distinct challenges posed by a particular industry, whether digital platforms, pharmaceuticals, or something else, expert and specialized knowledge becomes even more essential to making good enforcement decisions. Under current law and enforcement frameworks, there is no systematic way to bring such specialization into the ultimate adjudication of antitrust cases in industries not already covered by specific, competition-related, regulatory statutes. To be sure, the FTC and DOJ have divisions that specialize in various industrial sectors in which they have considerable expertise. Those divisions bring that expertise into their review of conduct and transactions, but neither the FTC nor DOJ has ultimate adjudicative authority over the cases they choose to litigate. The DOJ must go to federal court to seek enforcement. The FTC can opt for an administrative enforcement mechanism with the Commission itself sitting in appellate review of initial adjudication by an administrative law judge. The Commission's decision is, however, subject to review by federal appellate courts, which have not hesitated to reverse the agency's decisions. 40 The result is that, even when agencies have brought specific industry expertise into antitrust enforcement, doctrinal application and resolution still proceeds through the common-law process of adjudication by generalist judges.

E. Tradeoffs Inherent in the Adjudicatory Approach to Antitrust

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the ex post case-by-case approach, slow doctrinal evolution, and case selection mechanism of antitrust adjudication have potential advantages and disadvantages. The tradeoffs become particularly clear through the interaction of those three characteristics.

[\*1922] Adjudication may mitigate the rate of false positives or false negatives obtained through enforcement, as proceeding case-by-case is less likely to bring about those results than are general rules that impose limits on business conduct in advance, regardless of specific circumstances. Broad ex ante specifications could prohibit beneficial or harmless conduct, and narrow ex ante specifications could fail to prevent anticompetitive practices. As a decisionmaking process moves from strict ex ante prescription to pure case-by-case adjudication, particular facts and circumstances increasingly predominate over generic categorization of conduct. 41In principle, the movement along that spectrum enables the decisionmaker to avoid under-inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness of categorical rules. 42

The extent to which an adjudicator actually succeeds in reducing enforcement errors in either direction depends on the doctrine and precedent through which it evaluates the case-specific evidence. Doctrine and precedent will determine how a court allocates burdens, prioritizes facts, and weighs presumptions in evaluating the legality of conduct. If precedent provides mistaken guidance on those factors, case-specific adjudication might do no better a job than ex ante prohibitions in avoiding errors or bias toward either under or over-enforcement. For this reason, the evolutionary pace of doctrinal development through antitrust adjudication is very important. Where that evolution has been toward convergence with state-of-the-art analysis and evidence as to the effects of conduct, doctrinal stability is a virtue. Reasonable people disagree over the Supreme Court's movement from per se illegality to rule of reason treatment of vertical price restraints, as Justice Breyer's dissent in Leegin demonstrates. 43 The decision in that case nonetheless drew on a body of legal and economic analysis that, over decades, had continually narrowed the application of per se rules to vertical conduct and led logically (even if some might argue incorrectly) to the majority's conclusion. 44Many commentators might therefore say Leegin is a good example of where the evolution of doctrine through adjudication worked well: stakeholders had notice and the doctrine moved in an internally consistent direction. While it is debatable whether the per se rule against restraints on [\*1923] intra-brand competition has in recent years led to over-enforcement, there is a good case that it had done so in the past, 45so that the doctrine plausibly moved in an error-reducing direction.

However, where doctrine gets on the wrong track, the application of precedent will perpetuate rather than reduce enforcement errors. In the case of predation, for example, there is a good argument that, in the light of current economic knowledge, the Brooke Group decision has led to underenforcement. 46The potential case-by-case advantages of adjudication are lost where judicial precedent renders important facts and circumstances irrelevant. In such cases, the relatively slow process of doctrinal correction through common law evolution is harmful to sound antitrust enforcement.

The discussion above shows that the error-reducing potential of a case-by-case, adjudicatory approach to antitrust enforcement depends heavily on the actual doctrine courts apply and on the process by which that doctrine evolves. Similarly, whether case selection in an adjudicatory approach in fact directs judicial attention to the conduct that most warrants oversight depends on existing doctrine and precedent. It may well be that the conduct doing the most harm is also the conduct for which the courts impose the highest burdens of proof on plaintiffs. The deterrent effect of those burdens likely leads to fewer cases than the conduct's actual effects warrant. 47Similarly, doctrine that too readily imposes liability could have the opposite effect: lower barriers for plaintiffs would lead to too many cases and more devotion of judicial resources than the conduct deserves. 48Like error-reduction, the distribution of antitrust cases brought for adjudication depends heavily on the state of the doctrine and on the ability of the common law process to correct course where necessary.

The potential disadvantages of antitrust adjudication by generalist courts raise the question of whether a different approach might be preferable, specifically with regard to digital platforms. Digital platforms present relatively novel challenges. Considering the tenuous fit between some [\*1924] potential theories of harm and current antitrust doctrine, the complexity of the underlying technical issues in antitrust cases, and the interrelatedness of those issues and adjacent policy goals, a more informed, comprehensive approach coordinated by an expert regulatory agency might foster more advantages than does the exclusive resort to traditional antitrust adjudication. However, before we turn to the form such regulation might take, we briefly identify some general principles for such regulation.

### AT Econ Resillient

#### Your ev obviously doesn’t assume an economy where business confidence is low:

#### Decline cascades – nuclear war

Maavak 21 – Mathew Maavak, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

#### Extended COVID-induced economic instability causes human extinction. Global COVID recovery solves nuclear war.

RECNA, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) & Nautilus Institute (2021), ’21, Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 4:sup1, 6-39, DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867

The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats

The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come. The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5

Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order. In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply. The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the existential risks posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.

In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.

To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.

Developing Pandemic-nuclear Nexus Scenarios

How might the COVID-19 pandemic (and future pandemics) create new opportunities or challenges for governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear disarmament? And how might those challenges and opportunities emerge in Northeast Asia, in particular?

In the face of so much uncertainty, a powerful way to obtain navigational guidance and to develop robust strategies is to conduct scenario-based dialogues. Scenarios may be underpinned by analysis, but they rest primarily on eliciting diverse insights through a dialogic process (typically a workshop) that explores the multiple, powerful drivers of complex problems and possible strategies to resolve such problems. Rather than predict any specific future, the goal of developing scenarios is to prepare individuals and organizations for radically divergent, possible futures.

A scenario is a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments in which today’s decisions might play out. In practice, scenarios resemble a set of stories built around carefully constructed plots. These stories can express multiple perspectives on complex events and give multiple meaning to these events. The development of such scenarios was the primary goal of the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios workshop. Through this project, we wanted to develop an analytic understanding of the interrelated nature of nuclear weapons and global pandemics. We wanted to explore the potential levers and pathways to influence the future. And we wanted to find concrete strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resume disarmament, particularly novel approaches that could engage both state and non-state actors.

Shaping the Focal Question

At the outset of the Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project, the organizers framed a focal question that would guide the development of the scenarios: What are the opportunities driven by global pandemics for Northeast Asian governments, civil society, and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear disarmament? This focal question has twin normative values in it: (a) how to reduce the risk of nuclear war arising from the pandemic and (b) how to resume nuclear disarmament under pandemic conditions. Measures to realize (a) might be in opposition to measures to realize (b). They might be independent, or they might be complementary. Discovering opportunities where the measures are synergistic has the highest value; avoiding contradictory measures might be critically important. But forced to choose, we likely must go first and foremost with measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war, as disarmament becomes moot and improbable if nuclear war occurs.

As in any scenarios event, we sought to identify robust strategies that could work across the divergent, uncertainty-based scenarios and move each story line toward a higher probability of realizing these two strategic goals. We were particularly interested in prompting discussion on the role of cities as potential new players with regard to nuclear war risk reduction. The challenges of “global nuclear governance” and nuclear disarmament have traditionally been dominated by great powers (that is, nation-states).

But given their evident and emerging leading role as “first responders” to the existential threats of the coronavirus pandemic and climate change effects, we wanted to see how cities’ capacity and experience may be useful in relation to nuclear risk and disarmament. The focal question also centers on Northeast Asia, a region that was the site of the first use of nuclear weapons (in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and that today has thousands of cities, as well as potential for conflict on multiple fronts, including between China and Taiwan, China and the United States, and the ROK and DPRK. Northeast Asia sits at the nexus of relations between the world’s three largest nuclear armed states (China, Russia, and the United States), and it is home to the DPRK, a rapidly developing new nucleararmed state.

Identifying Critical Uncertainties

In the first phase of the scenario development process, participants were divided into four groups where they brainstormed a broad range of “critical uncertainties,” variables whose outcomes are both undetermined and important for shaping the near- and long-term future. Participants were asked to consider uncertainties based on different categories (social, technological, environmental, economic, political, military, and epidemiological). Through their initial brainstorm, groups developed a list of dozens of critical uncertainties (see Appendix 2). They were asked to narrow down their lists of uncertainties to those most likely to play a major role in shaping the pandemic-nuclear nexus. They then considered how these uncertainties could unfold along an axis with two diverging outcomes. Following are a few of the drivers participants identified: How might a distanced society affect nuclear strategies? On one end of the spectrum, for example, re-spatialization could lead to greater cooperation as people work across borders, physical and virtual. On the other end, the need to maintain distance could lead to shifts in militaries’ offshore strategies for deterrence/military projection of might and could potentially lead to the increased use of non-conventional (including nuclear) weapons.

How will changes in budgets affect dis/armament? The economic recession caused by the pandemic could lead to drastic cuts in funding for the military, including for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, countries’ economic struggles could lead them to increasingly favor investing in nuclear, as opposed to higher-cost conventional weapons.

How might pandemics affect global cooperation? The COVID-19 pandemic could serve as an impetus for increased international cooperation and the sharing of global information, which could extend to other areas, including nuclear. On the other hand, questions over the origin of the virus, border closures, and “vaccine competition” could lead to a rise in tensions.

How will information sharing evolve? The proliferation of misinformation through diverse media channels (including social media) could erode progress in tackling shared global challenges. Or new systems could emerge that help ensure that information is shared with a high level of transparency and be verified as accurate.

Will inequality increase or decrease? Following the economic recession caused by shutdowns aimed at limiting the pandemic, the gap could continue to grow between (and within) societies regarding economic well-being and human health. Or the pandemic may usher in a more redistributive economic system that leads to a decrease in inequality.

How will governments manage simultaneous or prolonged threats? Governments may struggle to contend with concurrent challenges of pandemics, climate change, food insecurity, and terrorism, leaving them to ignore the nuclear issue. Or they may find ways to collaborate, reallocating budgets toward effective solutions and developing international agreements that could later pave the way for disarmament.

What is the effect of technology on nuclear risk and disarmament? Changes in technology could have a major influence on nuclear risk. New risks could emerge from the proliferation of artificial intelligence systems (including in nuclear command, control, and communication systems), deep fakes, drones, and hackers intercepting and altering messages. On the other hand, technology could enhance capacity for early warning systems, increase monitoring of military movement, and improve communication systems.

#### Our impact is about the recovery from Covid decline—declining BizCon crushes it—Delta puts it on the brink

Zandi 8/18 – Mark Zandi, writer for CNN Business Perspectives, “Here's what the Delta variant means for the economic recovery,” 8/18/21, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/18/perspectives/economic-recovery-delta-variant/index.html

The US economy's immediate prospects appear inextricably tied to how the wave of infections and hospitalizations set off by the Delta variant of Covid-19 plays out. While it seems unlikely that the variant would become so disruptive that it undermines the recovery, there are mounting reasons to be worried that it may become a significant headwind to near-term economic growth.

Consumers are increasingly nervous about the variant, sparking concerns they will turn more skittish in their spending. Retail sales for July declined, while the University of Michigan's survey of consumer sentiment pulled back sharply in early August and is now lower than it was during the worst of the pandemic last spring. Spiking inflation isn't helping consumers' moods. The timing of the slump in sentiment and spending coincides with news stories of overwhelmed hospital systems in Florida and Texas, more serious illness among younger populations, and increasing breakthrough infections among those fully vaccinated.

Businesses have also suddenly become more nervous. According to Moody's Analytics weekly business confidence index, sentiment had significantly improved this spring when vaccinations ramped up and the pandemic was steadily winding down. But it has gone sideways since mid-June. Businesses' assessment of current conditions has turned particularly soft in the past few weeks, with more survey respondents saying conditions are weakening than those that say they are improving. This is the first time this has happened since the vaccines became widely available.

Businesses' expectations regarding the economy's prospects for the remainder of this year have also diminished significantly. The number of respondents that say the economy will continue to improve has declined from more than 60% to less than half, and those that say the economy will weaken has increased from near 30% to more than 40%. This hasn't impacted businesses' hiring and investment decisions yet, according to our survey, but it bears close watching, as the job market and broader economic recovery would be in jeopardy if businesses pull back on hiring and investments.

#### Key to jobs and recovery

Pawar 9/16 – Ameya Pawar, Fellow at Open Society Foundations, “The recovery will be weak if small businesses can’t get the credit they need and deserve,” 9/16/21, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-recovery-will-be-weak-if-small-businesses-cant-get-the-credit-they-need-and-deserve-11631722738

If small businesses do not recover from the coronavirus pandemic, the rest of the economy won’t either.

Across America, in big cities and small towns, the auto mechanic shops, restaurants, mom-and-pop retailers, and small industrial firms create two-thirds of all net new jobs. Moreover, the money that people spend in these businesses tends to stay local and accounts for 44% of all economic activity.

## DIB

### XT 1nc 2: Fill in

#### Hartung evidence says that the Pentagon fills in and strengthens the DIB—that zeroes the aff because it means the status quo solves—we’ll read some cards here:

#### Budget fluctuations make fill in inevitable—we have a chart.

DOD 18 (Department of Defense, oderniza 2018, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” DOD. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF//KDES).

Markets thrive on predictability, allowing businesses to make informed decisions and invest in the future. Defense spending inherently fluctuates with the arming for conflict and subsequent drawdown and decrease of program funding. But as illustrated in Figure 8, these swings in funding can be very dramatic, particularly in the funding streams for weapon systems procurement and research, design, test, and evaluation.

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

Figure 8: Defense Investment Spending From 1980 to 2017

A. Impacts of Budget Uncertainties At the macroeconomic level, defense spending uncertainty makes predicting the overall market size difficult, impeding forecasting across every tier in the supply chain. Uncertainty in spending inhibits investment in capabilities even where the overall sector market size is increasing, impacting defense suppliers and leading to revenue fluctuation, capital investment shortfalls, and suboptimal investment in R&D. Over time, spending instability also creates peaks of surge and valleys of drought – a pernicious, ambiguous pattern in which suppliers who build for scale production are left with excess capacity when programs end, creating long-term market distortion. The decade-long reliance on Congressional continuing resolutions11 has exacerbated uncertainty, both for DoD and across the supply chain. Combined with the adverse impacts of the Budget Control Act,12 these fluctuations challenge the viability of suppliers within the industrial base by diminishing their ability to hire and retain a skilled workforce, achieving production efficiencies, and in some cases, staying in business. Without correcting or mitigating this U.S. Government inflicted damage, DoD will be increasingly challenged to ensure a secure and viable supply chain for the platforms critical to sustaining American military dominance.

#### Corona proves, they will just give the defense base money

Aaron Mehta, 3-23-2020, Pentagon loosens cash flow for industry, more measures likely coming,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/coronavirus/2020/03/23/pentagon-loosens-cash-flow-for-industry-more-measures-likely-coming/, Accessed: 3-28-2020, /Kent Denver-MB

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has opened up cash flow for the defense industry, the latest in a series of moves from the department to combat economic damage brought about by the new coronavirus pandemic.

In a memo released Sunday, the department announced that progress payment rates for defense items under contract will increase from 80 percent of cost to 90 percent for large businesses, and from 90 percent to 95 percent for small businesses. The move will allow industry to receive more cash up front than under normal circumstances.

The order was signed by Kim Herrington, acting principal director for defense pricing and contracting at the Department of Defense. In a statement, spokesman Lt. Col. Mike Andrews called the move “an important avenue where industry cash flow can be improved.”

The Defense Contracting Management Agency “will work on mass modifications to contracts where applicable (vs one by one) using DCMA authorities,” Andrews said. “In addition, the Department is accelerating payments through several means to prime contracts and directing prime contracts to expedite payments to subcontractors.”

The increase in cash flow was sought by both industry and supporters in Congress. An increase in early payments was one of the requests made by the Maine delegation to Defense Secretary Mark Esper last week. The Pentagon plans to return to normal operations once the national emergency caused by COVID-19 has passed.

### XT 1NC 3: DIB Decline Inev

#### Trade war destroys defense industry—they can’t get access to vital materials

Reichmann 6/1 (Kelsey Reichmann, general assignment editorial fellow supporting Defense News, 6-1-2019, “Defense could be cut off from critical materials as trade war rhetoric with China grows,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/06/01/defense-could-be-cut-off-from-critical-materials-as-trade-war-rhetoric-with-china-grows//KDES).

\*\*edited for ableist language\*\*

WASHINGTON —As the trade war with China continues to escalate, the threats from China have shifted to critical minerals imported to the U.S. from China, which have the potential to ~~cripple~~ [damage] military development. China issued a reminder Wednesday that the U.S. could potentially be cut off from “rate earths” if the trade war continues. Rare earths are a group of chemically similar metallic elements. Last year China produced 78 percent of the world’s rare earths according to researchers at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. “China is far from running out of cards, and we have the will and determination to fight the U.S. to the end,” said a nationalistic Chinese newspaper, Global Times, in an editorial. The state-run China Daily reported that after President Xi Jinping visited a rare earth-related business earlier in the month he called rare earths “an important strategic resource.” A report from the Government Accountability Office from April 2019 looks at the dependence of the U.S. on these imported minerals. They classify minerals by net import reliance percentage, which looks at imports, exports, stock adjustments, and apparent U.S. consumption to create a percentage to show dependence. The report found eight of the 15 minerals analyzed had a net import reliance of over 50 percent and six out of 15 minerals were categorized as critical. Of those critical minerals, four had averaged over 50 percent net import reliance. These four minerals include barite, fluorspar, palladium, and platinum. Magnesium metal, which is one of six minerals listed by the Interior as critical to the U.S., is used in aerospace, defense, and transportation sectors. China is a top producer of magnesium metal, but the U.S. is predominately supplied by Israel and Canada. Tungsten, which is also listed as critical, is seeing an increase in net import reliance in 2017. Tungsten, used for cutting and drilling tool, jet engines, and cellular phones, is both produced and supplied mostly to the U.S. from China. “There are certain elements that are used in the production of specific military equipment…You need to make sure that you have either stockpiles or access to those,” said David Norquist, acting deputy secretary of defense, speaking at the Center for a New American Security on Thursday. “That’s an area where, as you look across the systems and you look at your future production, the question is, do I have those? Do I have enough of them, do I have access to them, where are they produced? “I think that’s a proper place for the Congress to focus on, and that’s an area we’re highlighting. We look forward to working with them on how best to make sure we protect those areas.” Jeff Green, president of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based in Washington, D.C., said in a commentary: “If China’s rare earth leverage over the U.S. is one-part strategic foresight, it is two parts American strategic miscalculation and shortsightedness. Today’s U.S. defense-industrial base is reliant on a globally integrated supply chain.”

### XT 1NC 4: DIB Bad

#### DIB can’t prevent great power conflict

William Greenwalt, April 2019, (Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security, former staff member on the Senate Arms Services Committee) LEVERAGING THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL BASE TO ADDRESS GREAT-POWER COMPETITION: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Leveraging_the_National_Technology_Industrial_Base_to_Address_Great-Power_Competition.pdf>

The difficulty with this problem set is that the current, dedicated US defense-industrial base and the US acquisition system are not prepared for a great-power war, nor the innovation necessary to compete in all five things the United States must do to meet its national security needs. Nor has it geared up to deliver the significant innovation in capability and doctrinal development to deliver a sufficient deterrent effect to prevent that war in the first place For the last seventeen years, the United States has been equipped to conduct current operations against insurgencies and terrorism in the arc of instability running through Central Asia to Northern Africa. Because of the constant threat of budget sequestration, wars have been fought on the cheap and readiness levels have fallen. Modernization is being conducted at non-economic order-of-production levels. Disruptive innovation has been practically nonexistent, as research funding has historically stopped at the 6.3, or advanced-technology, development level, leaving most innovations stuck in the so-called “valley of death.” Prototyping, or 6.4, funding has been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Science and technology (S&T) communities are addicted to the existing peacetime way of doing research by doling out funds in single million-dollar increments, and the budget reflects that. Business reform is further constrained by the inability to address the costs of socioeconomic requirements placed on the Pentagon by Congress and past administrations. Large-scale technological and business-process disruption will be needed to meet the great-power threat. While Congress took the first step in passing new-acquisition reforms in 2015 and 2016, much more needs to be done to implement these reforms and reform other business practices. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, since the end of the Cold War the United States and its allies seem to have subconsciously forgotten the requirements of deterrence, as there was no great-power rival to deter. With the resurrection of great-power challenges, the atrophy of US and allied capabilities during that period now appears to be a huge vulnerability.

### XT – AT: Cyber

#### No cyber impact – entities lack capacities to cause damage. Uncertainty ensures credible attribution, which deters large scale attacks. At best, low-level espionage occurs which isn’t catastrophic. All adversaries have no interest in it – that’s Lewis. Miscalculation has never occurred because of constraints and high degrees of control.

#### Won’t go nuclear.

Tucker ’18 [February 2, 2018 Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/02/no-us-wont-respond-cyber-attack-nukes/145700/]

The idea that the U.S. is building new low-yield nuclear weapons to respond to a cyber attack is “not true,” military leaders told reporters in the runup to the Friday release of the new Nuclear Posture Review.

“The people who say we lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons are saying, ‘but we want these low-yield nuclear weapons so that we can answer a cyber attack because we’re so bad at cyber security.’ That’s just fundamentally not true,” Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday at a meeting with reporters.

It’s an idea that military leaders have been pushing back against since the New York Times ran a Jan. 16 story headlined, “Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks With Nuclear Arms.”

When would the U.S. launch a nuclear attack in response to a non-nuclear event? The Defense Department says the threshold hasn’t changed since the Obama administration’s own nuclear posture review in 2010, but a draft of the new review that leaked online caused a bit of drama in its attempts to dispel “ambiguity.”

The new review gives examples of “non-nuclear strategic attacks,” Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy, told reporters on Thursday. “It could be catastrophic attacks against civilian populations, against infrastructure. It could be an attack using a non-nuclear weapon against our nuclear command-and-control [or] early-warning satellites. But we don’t talk about cyber.”

In his own conversation with reporters, Selva broadened “early warning” systems to include ones that provide “indications of warning that are important to our detection of an attack.” He also emphasized, “We never said ‘cyber.’”

There’s a reason for that. While cyber attacks on physical infrastructure can be very dangerous, they are unlikely to kill enough people to provoke a U.S. nuclear response.

An National Academies of Science and Engineering analysis of the vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure makes that point. A major cyber attack could cut off electrical power, resulting in “people dying from heat or cold exposure, etc.,” said Granger Morgan, co-director of the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center and one of the chairs of the report.  “A large outage of long duration could cover many states and last for weeks or longer. Whether and how many casualties there could be would depend on things like what the weather was during the outage.”

It’s a huge problem but not an event resulting in tens of thousands of immediate deaths.

Contrast that with a nuclear attack on a city like Moscow, even one using a device of 6 kilotons, much smaller than the ones the United States used against Japanese targets in World War II. The immediate result: there would be 40,000 deaths, according to the online nuclear simulation tool NukeMap.

Russia has demonstrated a willingness to take down power services with cyber attacks, as they did in Ukraine on Christmas Eve 2015. But these attacks were brief and occured in the context of actual fighting.

In other words, the worst cyber physical attack that top experts believe credible likely does not meet the threshold that the Defense Department has set out for deploying a nuclear weapon.

## Hegemony

### XT 1NC 1: No Power Transition

#### US China power transition war extremely unlikely—that answers Kim

David C. Kang, Professor of IR @ USC, & Xinru Ma, PhD Candidate @ USC, ‘18 “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,” TWQ, Volume 41 Iss. 1 26 Mar 2018

Are power transitions between a rising power and a declining hegemon particularly volatile? Is a war between China and the United States possible or even likely as a power transition draws near? Scholars and policymakers are increasingly worried about such a possibility. Richard Ned Lebow and Ben Valentino, specialists in international relations, point out that power transition “theory has become an accepted framework for many scholars and policymakers who focus on Asia,” 1 while Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China during the Clinton administration, has written that, “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.”

2 More recently, political scientist Graham Allison wrote that “war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not.” 3 But what historical record are Shirk and Allison referring to? By far, the most commonly examined case studies of power transition in the scholarly literature are the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) and the rise of Germany under Bismarck and Anglo-German rivalry of the twentieth century.4 In arguing that contemporary U.S.-China relations are potentially dangerous, Allison claims that 12 out of 16 historical power transitions ended in war; but every single one of his cases before the mid-nineteenth century involves only European powers (e.g. Habsburgs, Dutch Republic, Sweden, France). Only two cases involve Japan (the Russo-Japanese War and World War II), while China appears just once (First Sino-Japanese War). Allison may be the most recent scholar to use Greek and European history to explain the entire world’s future, but he is neither the first nor the only scholar to do so. The link has been made for decades.5 Scholars also regularly use the rise of nineteenth century Germany as an analogy for Asia today.6 Even when scholars argue that China’s rise might not cause the same instability that Germany’s did, they are still operating within a framework that uses European examples as case studies to make sense of Asia, and often the entire globe.

It is troubling, however, that the empirical examples that international relations scholars use to derive their theories are almost all European. This European selection bias has led to an overexpectation that power transitions and the rise and decline of great powers relative to each other are a prime factor for war. The rise and fall of Chinese dynasties, however, are all potential examples of power transitions, not to mention those in Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and elsewhere. If we widen the selection of cases, particularly to examine important cases from East Asian history, we would find very different implications for how widely applicable and universal the theory actually is, and to what extent it explains security relations today. Specifically, examining two pre-modern East Asian cases—the Imjin War (1592-1598) and the Ming-Qing transition (1644-1683)—as we will below, lead to three new insights about power transitions: First, power vacuums are often as dangerous as power transitions. Second, internal decline is often more damaging to hegemons than are external challengers. Third, challenges often came from the smallest powers, not the largest powers.

#### Deep engagement makes miscalc likely – putting our foot down their throats creates first use incentives and use-or-lose pressures. That’s Mckinney. Miscalc outweighs transition war – its the most likely scenario for conflict. Don’t forget the lesson of world war one: instability is not a worthy price to pay on the quest for supremacy.

**Gompert et al. 16** — Gompert, David C., M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University; B.S. in engineering, United States Naval Academy, Astrid Cevallos and Cristina L. Garafola, M.A. in international relations and international economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced and International Studies; Certificate in Chinese and American studies, Hopkins-Nanjing Center; B.A. in international relations and Chinese, Hamilton College, 2016 (“War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,” *RAND*, Available Online at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html>) RMT

The need to think through war with China is made all the more pressing by developments in military technology and associated doctrine: Sensors, global positioning, weapon guidance, digital networking, and other capabilities used to target opposing forces have advanced to the point where both U.S. and Chinese military forces pose serious threats to each other. This creates the ability and a reason to strike enemy forces before they strike one’s own, which is bound to influence both nations’ war planning.3 Military technology and planning are thus creating a bias toward sharp exchange of strikes from the start, with both sides intent on gaining the upper hand or at least denying it to the other. To quote Chinese strategists: “[I]t has become possible to achieve operational objectives before an enemy can make a response. . . . If the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] fights with a high-tech and powerful enemy, we must achieve operational suddenness.”4 The combination of such confidence and urgency might be misplaced and dangerous—and not just for China.

A hazard inherent in all war planning is that it sets and limits expectations of what will actually occur. Only a militarily dominant belligerent can afford to be so cavalier, and when it comes to China, the United States is no longer dominant, nor can it afford to be cavalier. As its military advantages vis-à-vis China decline, the United States can be less confident that war would conform to its plans. Improved Chinese forces, particularly for anti-access and area denial (A2AD), means that the United States cannot be sanguine about gaining operational control, destroying China’s defenses, and achieving decisive victory if a war occurred.

Because Sino-U.S. war could be extremely costly even for the victor, it is **not likely to result from premeditated attack** by either side. Yet Sino-U.S. crises could occur and involve incidents or **miscalculations** that lead to hostilities. China could try to intimidate its neighbors below the threshold of U.S. intervention, yet **misjudge** where that threshold is. China could underestimate U.S. willingness to back Japan militarily in a crisis over disputed territory in the **East China Sea**. Moreover, the contradiction between China’s claim of sovereignty over its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and U.S. insistence that such zones are international waters beyond 12 nautical miles could bring forces into close and hazardous proximity if either side opts to enforce its stance.

A case in point of how conflicting Chinese and U.S. views could lead to war is found in the South China Sea. In support of China’s objective of making virtually the entire South China Sea sovereign territorial waters, China has been building artificial islands, airstrips, and other militarily useful infrastructure—and claiming 200-mile EEZs around them. The United States will not accept this because it runs afoul of several U.S. interests: the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, the principle of freedom of the seas, the fact that some 40 percent of world trade passes through the South China Sea, and the expectations of the Philippines and other U.S. friends that the United States will not condone Chinese unilateral action. Consequently, the Americans have steamed naval surface combatants through the very waters China is claiming and on which it is building. There seems little doubt that the Chinese will operate forces in these contested waters, in which case Chinese and U.S. forces will be present and actively shadowing or constricting the other side’s forces. If, or as, a crisis occurs, the risk of a spark causing inadvertent conflict would be **heightened**, perhaps **greatly**. Moreover, political leaders on both sides may become less flexible, not more, with so much at stake, and military commanders could urge in favor of escalation either to deter or to prepare for conflict. While current odds strongly favor the United States militarily in the South China Sea, making Beijing more likely than Washington to back down, the improvement and extension of Chinese A2AD in that direction could make a crisis harder to defuse. As horrific as a SinoU.S. war could be, it cannot be considered implausible.

As we will see, the cause of war and the importance each side attaches to it could affect how fiercely and long it will fight, though hostilities can create dynamics and fury that eclipse rational calculation. If both sides have substantial war-making capacity and neither one can gain operational dominance and control, there is a danger of prolonged ferocious fighting at great cost, even though both might plan and expect it to end quickly. Such conditions **recall those of Europe in 1914**, when a crisis triggered near-automatic execution of military plans to attack before being attacked, when the economies of the two sides were interlocked, and when both foresaw a short war. As fighting raged, casualties soared, and territory was lost and won, the belligerents found themselves fighting over far more than an incident involving Serbian nationalists seeking to end Austria-Hungary’s control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, as then, the result could be huge military losses (then in foot soldiers, now in weapon platforms) and lasting economic damage on both sides.

In sum, the risk that some Sino-U.S. confrontation will lead to hostilities, the declining ability of the United States to gain militaryoperational control, the conventional counterforce capabilities (the capabilities of U.S. and Chinese forces to target and destroy each other) of both militaries, the vulnerability of both economies, and the potential for prolonged fighting with devastating results demand fresh but sober thinking about Sino-U.S. war. Because war with China, seen in this light, is not implausible and could be very dangerous and very demanding, the United States must be prepared for it. Already, military requirements for a Sino-U.S. war figure prominently in U.S. force planning and operating concepts (as they do in China’s). But larger national requirements, depending on the war’s intensity and duration, have not received equivalent attention. Both the United States and China need to be aware of what the costs of war might be. If advances in conventional counterforce capabilities are making war harder to control, leaders need **political instruments** to keep combat from destroying more than it can gain.

Factors Considered

As U.S. military dominance wanes, U.S. strategists must consider (as this study does) a range of contingencies and corresponding requirements. Recent research on strategic decisionmaking finds that unjustified faith in the ability to plan, control, and limit the duration of fighting is a common mistake in starting wars that end badly. After analyzing numerous historical cases, a RAND study concluded that “confidence that an adversary will comply with one’s script and . . . that the results of a decision can be controlled is tantamount to assum-ing away risk. When this leads to failure to prepare for bad results, the consequences can be that much worse.”5

Essential though it is for U.S. armed forces to have plans to fight and win, excessive confidence in such plans could have detrimental effects on U.S. peacetime policy, crisis management, and wartime operations. At worst, inattention to the range of possible paths and consequences of war with China could lead the United States into one for which it is unprepared. Likewise, the Chinese would be profoundly wrong to think that improving their military capabilities would make a war with the United States controllable, winnable, and affordable.6 As we will see, it could be that neither country is able to control, win, or afford a future war.

Paradoxically, as both sides hone their military strategies with the aim of controlling a war, they reduce the possibility of control. Military officers of both countries have spoken and written about how to achieve operational advantage, or at least avoid disadvantage, by striking the other side’s forces at the outset of a conflict.7 Given the **“firstmover” advantage** and the corresponding danger that perception of a climbing probability of hostilities would increase the pressure on each side’s trigger finger, the goal of avoiding a war must compete with that of winning one. Likewise, as we will see, the goal of winning a war must be weighed against the goal of containing its costs. Given the potential military, economic, and political costs of a long conflict, each side wants to succeed quickly. Accordingly, the Chinese stress the need to strike intervening U.S. forces early and then to limit the duration and scope of fighting that ensues, especially by preventing attacks on China itself. In turn, U.S. warfighting concepts rest on the logic that gaining operational control, limiting losses, and achieving victory might depend on disabling Chinese A2AD capabilities before they can be used to full effect to disable U.S. forces.

The strong preference of both states to avoid a long war is only natural, given expected military losses and other costs. Yet the very military strategies that call for each to strike the other’s forces hard and early, perhaps preemptively, could **work against a war-ending compromise** and lead to the prolongation and expansion of war. Consider the major wars of the 20th century, in which the side that attacked first— Germany twice and Japan once—summoned the other side’s will to fight, persevere, and ultimately prevail.8 Indeed, it is wise to heed the simple verity that striking first does not ensure victory. Moreover, the path of a Sino-U.S. war might be determined not just by military operations but also by economic, political, and international effects and pressures. We will see that the longer war lasts, the more important nonmilitary factors might become.

The assumption that a Sino-U.S. war would be over quickly is not supported by evidence that either side would rapidly exhaust its warmaking capacity. China and the United States have considerable military, economic, industrial, and demographic depth. If China is vulnerable to critical shortages in a war with the United States, it could be in losses of frontline military systems—its backup forces being largely obsolescent—or in oil supplies, of which it imports about 60 percent and has a declared strategic reserve of just ten days or so.9

As important as physical wherewithal is the political stamina of the two states. At first, the Chinese government could largely ignore domestic opposition, whereas the U.S. government could not. Yet the legitimacy of the Chinese state rests on its ability to provide for the material needs and improve the living standards of the population, which would be at risk by a costly war. Just as political will could deter mine a war’s duration, the war’s dynamics—military success or failure, casualties, costs, and expectations of what further fighting might bring—could determine will. All else being equal, the more even the military capabilities, the less likely that one side’s will would crack before the other’s.

Finally, willingness to suffer losses and support prolonged fighting could be affected by the perceived stakes of the conflict. Thus, the path to war could affect the path of war, including its severity and duration. Consider several situations that could turn violent:

• Sino-Japanese skirmishing over disputed territory in the **East China Sea**, where the United States has said its defense treaty with Japan applies

• Chinese harassment to press its territorial claims in (and to) **the South China Sea—**against the Philippines or Vietnam, for example—in the face of U.S. insistence on peaceful dispute resolution and freedom of the seas

• uncoordinated military interventions by Chinese, South Korean, or U.S. forces in the event of a collapse of **North Korea**

• Chinese threat or use of force to intimidate or seize **Taiwan**

• an incident at sea, such as the **downing of an aircraft**, owing to forces operating in close proximity, perhaps in EEZ waters claimed as sovereign by China but as commons by the United States

To illustrate, the United States might be willing to fight resolutely to prevent China from gaining control of the South China Sea, whereas China might seek a peaceful solution in the face of such American resolve. In contrast, the Chinese might be more determined to prevent Taiwan’s independence from China than the United States is to prevent Taiwan’s forcible unification with China. The analysis that follows does not deal with the merits of Sino-American quarrels or the probability that they will lead to war, but it does recognize that asymmetric interests can result in asymmetric resolve in the face of losses.

These factors suggest a need to examine with rigor how a SinoU.S. war might be fought, how long it might last, and how its mounting costs and shifting outlook could affect the ability and will of each side to keep fighting. One hundred years ago, European leaders and strategists, having formed alliances and adopted mobilization plans that would lead readily, if not automatically, from confrontation to war, erred further by assuming that war would be brief, either because their side would win quickly or because both sides would want to end the war before their armies and interlocking economies were devastated. Yet for four years neither side would compromise to end the stalemated carnage. A Sino-U.S. war would hold similar dangers: an incentive to strike first and a belief that fighting would end quickly and limit costs. Such thinking could turn a crisis into a conflict and leave the United States unprepared if war occurred and turned out to be lengthy.

### 1NC 2: Power Parity Good

#### Power parity creates strategic stability that prevents nuclear war. China revisionism operates continuously, not discretely.

Jared Morgan McKinney, Professor of IR @ Nanyang Tech (Singapore), ‘19, How to avoid a contest for supremacy in East Asia, Comparative Strategy, 38:4, 316-326,

Comparative Strategy was founded to help the U.S. triumph in a quest for supremacy with a “traditional imperial international order based on a totalitarian political-system.” The struggle, as the journal’s founding editor then characterized it, had been long in the making, but had been enabled by “the final breakup of the European colonial system after World War II” which had “left a vacuum” that the USSR was “moving to fill.”

71 The contrast was between an America whose “conquests are made with the plowshare,” and a Russia whose conquests were made “with the sword.” The one stood for international “freedom,” the other, international “servitude.” 72 A principal objection to any call for abandoning America’s strategy of dominance in Asia is that China is replicating the USSR’s former quest for supremacy. China is not going to be satisfied with balance, parity, or equilibrium: it wants what America fears, dominance. China’s “revisionist” territorial ambitions in the region are generally submitted as the proof for this proposition. The trouble with this move is that it treats the category “revisionist” as if it were discrete (yes or no) when it is actually continuous.

73 The vital point is not whether a state is committed to modifying some aspects of the existing order, but which aspects and to what extent. The vast majority of China specialists, across the entire ideological spectrum, agree that China’s territorial ambitions are limited, derived from (perceived) historical inequities, and tied to popular legitimization.74 Contrary to much rhetoric, China has never clarified the nature of the claims implied by the Nine-Dashed Line.75 A reasonable way to interpret the ambiguity is to think of it as a bargaining tactic: China has “padded” its position in order to improve its ability to negotiate the claims.76 Importantly, this implies China, though surely a tough actor, is willing to accept an eventual compromise settlement. Other than the territorial issues, there are a few points of exasperation with other (perceived) inequities in the international system,77 but China’s overall approach has been to seek gradual reform through legitimate means.78 In short: China is neither a modern equivalent to the expansionist and imperialist Soviet Union nor the revolutionary and totalitarian China of the Mao years.79 Just as importantly, there is no “vacuum” in Asia today.80 To the contrary, the states of the region are prosperous, relatively stable, and increasingly armed with area-denial weapons.81 Neither the context of contemporary international politics in Asia nor the nature of the contemporary Chinese state indicate a quest for supremacy is imperative or inevitable.

Even if this is so, what about the claim that even China’s limited ambitions conflict with vital American interests? The “national interest,” like the “public interest,” is a contested concept.82 Nonetheless, generally “vital” interests are considered those necessary for America’s survival and flourishing. A common attempt to meet this standard is to talk about the amount of commerce that travels through the South China Sea (allegedly around $5 trillion) and then to suggest that China’s territorial claims and interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty (UNCLOS) threatens this trade. But this argument fails to convince: the vast majority of this commerce is going to or from China. Furthermore, shipping density maps indicate that most of the commerce not being routed through China is coast hugging and already outside China’s Nine-Dashed Line. So even if China did interfere with commerce within the NineDashed Line—something not even a scintilla of evidence suggests is likely—it would be principally its own commerce it was upsetting.83 China committing economic suicide is hardly a violation of an American “vital” interest! The “magical” discourse about a “rules-based order” in East Asia is about geopolitics, not economics.84

As for Taiwan, geostrategists tend to argue that the island forms an essential part of what Nicholas Spykman called East Asia’s “maritime periphery” and what today is generally called the “first island chain.” 85 If the U.S. were to back off from actively propping up the ROC regime, the danger is less that Taiwan would be conquered—in fact, Taiwan has an extensive capability to inflict extreme pain on an invader86—and more that it would let Chinese naval forces, particularly ballistic missile submarines, transit into the blue waters of the Western Pacific. Such transiting is necessary because China’s Jin-Class SSBNs have to travel approximately 4,000 kms east in order to be in range of the continental U.S.87 This, however, can be seen as a feature rather than a bug. China’s nuclear force is currently potentially vulnerable to an American first-strike.88 There is some evidence China is moving from a minimum to a limited deterrence posture,89 but it is still a long way from accomplishing this. For the time being, there is a real possibility China could be pushed into a “use or lose” situation, i.e., the most destabilizing and escalatory of strategic scenarios.90 A geopolitical situation that permitted China’s ballistic missile submarines to break out of the first island chain could help restore and preserve strategic stability. Arms races and rapid technological innovations create conditions where even a solid nuclear deterrent could be undermined;91 today, this is even truer of China’s small arsenal. In an age of nuclear weapons, Spykman’s “maritime periphery” may simply be too good of a barrier, one which suggests the strategic paradox: “nothing fails like success.”

Conclusion

At some point in the coming generation, it is highly likely—indeed, effectively certain—that the developing contest for supremacy will result in serious crises that will threaten the United States, China, and Asia with the prospect of major war. Whether such a war would go nuclear is now simply one question among many, for this is an age in which potential domains of conflict are expanding, and certainly include space, cyber, and the geo-economic.92 If war does result from these crises, historians will likely look back upon the contest for supremacy with critical eyes, wondering why all of the intelligence of the modern age still allowed the strategic situation to be framed by a false dichotomy (dominance or subservience). If war does not result, that will be the moment in which a shift in U.S. policy will become the most conceivable; the moment when the false certitudes of PTT and the quest for supremacy are cast aside, and—for the sake of peace—a new policy of cautious equilibrium is articulated. It took one hundred years for the Abbe de Saint-Pierre’s ideas to bear fruit. It can only be hoped that the delay is not, this time, so long.

#### Outweighs the case and makes miscalculated war inevitable. SSBN survivability is the biggest internal link to stability and non-survivability causes pro-SSBN deployment that makes nuclear war inevitable.

Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, ‘18, "The Survivability of China’s SSBNs and Strategic Stability," https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/10/24/survivability-of-china-s-ssbns-and-strategic-stability-pub-77494

Of all the aspects of China’s SSBNs, their overall survivability is the most important factor in determining their impact on strategic stability. Survivability refers to an SSBN’s capability—through stealth, supporting forces, and other means—to remain safe from an enemy’s ASW efforts and, if needed, deliver SLBMs through an enemy’s missile defenses to strike their targets.

SSBN survivability has a significant impact on crisis stability. If China were concerned that its SSBNs could be destroyed, it would have a greater incentive to use the nuclear weapons onboard early in a conflict—even at the first sign of a preemptive strike by an adversary—before the weapons were lost. Moreover, concern about SSBN survivability could lead China to employ pro-SSBN forces (friendly general-purpose forces used to protect SSBNs) in aggressive ways to counter an enemy’s ASW capabilities, raising the risk of a conventional military conflict. Because such a conflict would be fought in the presence of SSBNs, it would unfold under the nuclear shadow and carry a greater risk of escalation.

SSBN survivability also seriously affects arms race stability. China’s accelerated investment into its SSBN program in recent years has been partially driven by concerns about the overall credibility of its nuclear deterrent. If Beijing feels its existing SSBN fleet falls short of what is required for a credible deterrent, it will likely increase its investment and build more and better SSBNs. These actions could, in turn, increase threat perceptions in other countries and intensify the existing competition. The arms competition resulting from Chinese efforts to protect its SSBNs and from other countries’ countermeasures could extend into the domain of conventional forces, including even unmanned vessels.

### --AT: Revisionism

#### 1. Reject buzzword explanation. Revisionism isn’t yes or no but based on degrees. Their theory is too totalizing and assumes china wants to overturn the whole world order.

#### 2.China supports the LIO.

Michael D. Swaine, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies, PhD, AM, Harvard University BA, George Washington University, 1-16-2019, "A Relationship Under Extreme Duress: U.S.-China Relations at a Crossroads," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/16/relationship-under-extreme-duress-u.s.-china-relations-at-crossroads-pub-78159

Thirdly, despite constant repetition by officials and pundits alike, there is no substantive evidence that Beijing is pursuing a deliberate strategy to dominate Asia and the world militarily and overturn the existing global order. Beijing is certainly acquiring military capabilities that undermine America’s long-standing predominance in that realm, most notably (and almost exclusively) in the Western Pacific. And it at times uses its military and para-military power to intimidate other claimants to disputed maritime territories in the East and South China Seas. Yet the former behavior is a perhaps understandable response to Beijing’s desire to reduce the continued vulnerability of its growing domestic and foreign assets to America’s still-dominant power, not proof of a belligerent intent to take over the region (although this could change if the current rivalry deepens greatly). The latter behavior is certainly very troubling, but speaks to the need for a binding code of conduct that prohibits such actions, along with limits on specific types of militarization in sensitive areas. Beijing has shown no signs that it would reject either development; to the contrary, it has professed some support for them and should be pressed more to back up its words with concrete actions. The U.S. should do the same.

Finally, the idea that China wants to overturn the global order is perhaps the most distorted accusation of all. Beijing has benefitted enormously from the post-WWII economic order. It also has taken advantage of that order in at times unacceptable ways and seeks to modify it to better reflect its growing influence. This suggests the need to adapt existing institutions such as the WTO and IMF to more reasonably reflect China’s expanding global impact while providing clearer, more comprehensive and enforceable rules of behavior acceptable to all powers. Beijing is certainly not a proponent of pluralist liberal democracy and in that sense does not support regional or global norms or practices designed to expand such systems internationally. But it is far from clear that the continued expansion of democratic systems is essential to the maintenance of the global order. Indeed, in addition to supporting to varying degrees the major economic pillars of that order as noted above, China in fact supports many others, including WMD non-proliferation agreements, efforts to protect against nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, pandemics, climate change, and international crime, and many tenants of the UN Charter, e.g., regarding the restrictive use of force to resolve inter-state disputes. This is hardly evidence of a desire to replace the existing order with a largely undefined “revisionist’ order, as Washington now alleges.

Lacking conclusive evidence for the overblown, categorical condemnations they tend to fashion, the Trump administration, its supporters, and some individual scholars or analysts seek to buttress their accusations with arm-waving references to the general history of rising powers, realpolitik theories of anarchic struggle among power-maximizing states, or assumptions about foreign policy behavior based almost solely on a state’s political system

#### 3.Consensus of qualified authors go neg – their theory is too monolithic.

Fravel et al. ’19 (M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, Ezra Vogel; professor of political science at MIT; distinguished scholar at the Wilson Center and a former U.S. ambassador to China; senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs; professor emeritus at Harvard University; co-signed by over 100 experts, who include James Acton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program and Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Craig Allen, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei from 2014–2018, Andrew Bacevich, co-founder, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Jeffrey A. Bader, former senior director for East Asia on National Security Council 2009-2011 and fellow, Brookings Institution, C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow and director emeritus, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jan Berris, vice president, National Committee on United States-China Relations, Dennis J. Blasko, former U.S. Army Attaché to China, 1992-1996, Pieter Bottelier, visiting scholar, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University,, Ian Bremmer, president, Eurasia Group, Richard Bush, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, Brookings Institution, Jerome A. Cohen, faculty director, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University, Warren I. Cohen, distinguished university professor emeritus, University of Maryland, Bernard Cole, former U.S. Navy captain, James F. Collins, U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation 1997-2001, Gerald L Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus, Columbia University, Toby Dalton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert Daly, director, Kissinger Institute on China and the U.S., Wilson Center, Michael C. Desch, Packey J. Dee Professor of International Affairs and director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, Mac Destler, professor emeritus, University of Maryland School of Public Policy,, Bruce Dickson, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University, David Dollar, senior fellow, Brookings Institution, Peter Dutton, senior fellow, U.S.-Asia Law Institute; adjunct professor, New York University School of Law, Robert Einhorn, senior fellow, Brookings Institution; former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, 1999-2001, Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, Thomas Fingar, Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, 2005-2008, Mary Gallagher, political science professor and director of the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, John Gannon, adjunct professor, Georgetown University; former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 1997-2001,, Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, University of Pennsylvania, Steven M. Goldstein, associate of the Fairbank Center; director of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at Harvard University, David F. Gordon, senior advisor, International Institute of Strategic Studies; former director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, 2007-2009, Philip H. Gordon, Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; former special assistant to the president and Coordinator for the Middle East and assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, Morton H. Halperin, former director of Policy Planning Staff at State Department, 1998-2001, Lee Hamilton, former congressman; former president and director of the Wilson Center,, Clifford A. 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Kapp & Associates, Inc.; former president, U.S.-China Business Council; former president, Washington Council on International Trade, Albert Keidel, adjunct graduate professor, George Washington University; former deputy director of the Office of East Asian Nations at the Treasury Department, 2001-2004, Robert O. Keohane, professor of International Affairs emeritus, Princeton University, William Kirby, Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, Helena Kolenda, program director for Asia, Henry Luce Foundation, Charles Kupchan, professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, David M. 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Walder, Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University, Graham Webster, coordinating editor, Stanford-New America DigiChina Project, David A. Welch, University Research Chair, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Daniel B. Wright, president and CEO, GreenPoint Group; former managing director for China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue, Treasury Department; 7/3/19; “China is not an enemy”; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html>; Washington Post; accessed 10/16/19; TV)

We are members of the scholarly, foreign policy, military and business communities, overwhelmingly from the United States, including many who have focused on Asia throughout our professional careers. We are deeply concerned about the growing deterioration in U.S. relations with China, which we believe does not serve American or global interests. Although we are very troubled by Beijing’s recent behavior, which requires a strong response, we also believe that many U.S. actions are contributing directly to the downward spiral in relations.

The following seven propositions represent our collective views on China, the problems in the U.S. approach to China and the basic elements of a more effective U.S. policy. Our institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only.

1. China’s troubling behavior in recent years — including its turn toward greater domestic repression, increased state control over private firms, failure to live up to several of its trade commitments, greater efforts to control foreign opinion and more aggressive foreign policy — raises serious challenges for the rest of the world. These challenges require a firm and effective U.S. response, but the current approach to China is fundamentally counterproductive.

2. We do not believe Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere; nor is China a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone. Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.

3. U.S. efforts to treat China as an enemy and decouple it from the global economy will damage the United States’ international role and reputation and undermine the economic interests of all nations. U.S. opposition will not prevent the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, a greater global market share for Chinese companies and an increase in China’s role in world affairs. Moreover, the United States cannot significantly slow China’s rise without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat China as an economic and political enemy, it will weaken its relations with those allies and could end up isolating itself rather than Beijing.

4. The fear that Beijing will replace the United States as the global leader is exaggerated. Most other countries have no interest in such an outcome, and it is not clear that Beijing itself sees this goal as necessary or feasible. Moreover, a government intent on limiting the information and opportunities available to its own citizens and harshly repressing its ethnic minorities will not garner meaningful international support nor succeed in attracting global talent. The best American response to these practices is to work with our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which China is offered the opportunity to participate. Efforts to isolate China will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and tolerant society.

# 1NR

## Budget

#### Passes now – pressure from leadership and stimulus.

Julia Cherner 9/12/21. Desk Assistant at ABC News. “Manchin, Sanders at odds over $3.5 trillion budget resolution”. ABC News. Sept 12 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/strategic-pause-budget-bill-sen-joe-manchin/story?id=79961426

Sanders emphasized the scope of the reconciliation bill, arguing that polling has shown now is the time for Congress to tackle these challenges through passing both bills.

"Working families cannot afford child care for their kids, young people cannot afford to go to college," Sanders said. "And then on top of all of that, the scientific community is telling us that we're looking at a cataclysmic crisis in terms of climate -- Oregon is burning, California is burning."

"I think we can do all of this," Sanders added. "We can do the physical infrastructure. We can do the reconciliation bill, create millions of good jobs, and finally tell the American people that we are going to stand up for working families."

Stephanopoulos pressed Sanders on the slim Democratic majority in the Senate.

"There's no margin for error in the Senate. If you vote against it, it doesn't pass. If Sen. Manchin votes against it, it doesn't pass. I mean -- so, you're likely, if you both stick to your positions, you're going to end up with nothing," Stephanopoulos said.

"That is a possibility, and I think that would be a disaster for the American people," Sanders responded. "But you've got the president of the United States, you've got leadership in the House and the Senate … you know, this is not Joe Manchin versus Bernie Sanders."

Sanders added that the "real danger" is that the infrastructure bill will not pass in the House, as some progressive Democrats have pledged to not vote for it unless the budget bill is on the table as well.

Ultimately Sanders said he is optimistic about the bills’ prospects, pointing to the successful passage of the American Rescue Plan, Biden’s first major legislative victory granting $1.9 trillion to stimulus payments and coronavirus economic relief.

"We worked together (on the American Rescue Plan), we did, and I think we're going to do it again," Sanders said.

#### There’s consensus.

Sean Sullivan et. al 9/12/21. Reporter covering national politics. Marianna Sotomayor reports on Democratic and Republican leadership in the House. Tyler Pager is a White House reporter. Jeff Stein is the White House economics reporter. “Democrats sorting through painful sacrifices as social bill enters final stretch”. Washington Post. Sept 12 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-sorting-through-painful-sacrifices-as-social-bill-enters-final-stretch/2021/09/11/49c4106c-122f-11ec-bc8a-8d9a5b534194\_story.html

In some ways, the debate is less about individual policies than the broader identity of a Democratic Party that has moved decisively to the left, a shift that is exciting liberals and worrying moderates.

Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla.), a centrist, pledged during last week’s Ways and Means Committee meeting to vote against each element of the bill because the rushed process fails to account for “how much we’re spending, how much we’re raising, how we’re spending some of the money, and how we’re raising any of the money.”

Still, most Democrats are optimistic they will reach a deal, saying their members recognize the stakes — and the price of failing to seize the opportunity.

“Windows open and windows close for reasons you can’t control,” said former senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut, a Biden friend. “This is a moment to do something in a meaningful way. You don’t let a moment pass.”

#### Budget will pass but no room for error

The Guardian 9-7-21 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/07/biden-democrats-brewing-battle-budget-bill

Congress will return from its summer recess later this month, and some Democrats are already gearing up for a political fight – with each other. Democratic lawmakers are looking to pass their $3.5tn spending package, after the House and the Senate approved the blueprint for the budget bill last month. The ambitious legislation encompasses much of Joe Biden’s economic agenda, including proposals to expand access to affordable childcare, invest in climate-related initiatives and broaden Medicare coverage. But to get the bill passed, Democrats will first need to reach an agreement on the cost of the legislation. Centrist Democrats, including Senators Kyrsten Sinema and Joe Manchin, have expressed concern about the bill’s $3.5tn price tag, while progressives have indicated they will fiercely oppose any attempt to cut funding in the proposal. With his entire economic agenda hanging in the balance, Biden will need to convince the two fractious wings of his party to come together and pass a comprehensive spending package. And given Democrats’ extremely narrow majorities in both the House and the Senate, there is virtually no room for error. Despite warning signs of intra-party friction over the cost of the budget bill, congresswoman Suzan DelBene, who chairs the centrist New Democrat Coalition, said the House’s focus right now should still be on the content of the legislation. “I think discussion of a number is more distracting when the focus really needs to be on, what is the substance going to be of this legislation?” DelBene told the Guardian. “If we have strong legislation the people support, I think we can find the path forward.” Over in the Senate, majority leader Chuck Schumer is attempting to advance the bill using reconciliation, meaning Democrats do not need any Republican support to pass the legislation. But the 50-50 split in the upper chamber means that every single Democratic senator must be on board to get the bill approved. Schumer has been clear-eyed about the challenges ahead for the legislation. Shortly after the Senate approved the blueprint for the bill in a party-line vote last month, Schumer told reporters, “We’ve labored for months and months to reach this point, and we have no illusions – maybe the hardest work is yet to come.” Manchin proved Schumer’s point last Thursday, when he wrote a Wall Street Journal op-ed calling for a “strategic pause” in advancing the spending package. “While some have suggested this reconciliation legislation must be passed now, I believe that making budgetary decisions under artificial political deadlines never leads to good policy or sound decisions,” Manchin said in the op-ed. “I, for one, won’t support a $3.5tn bill, or anywhere near that level of additional spending, without greater clarity about why Congress chooses to ignore the serious effects inflation and debt have on existing government programs.” Bernie Sanders, the leftwing chairman of the Senate budget committee, responded to Manchin’s warning in kind, threatening to torpedo the bipartisan infrastructure bill if the spending package is not approved. “Rebuilding our crumbling physical infrastructure – roads, bridges, water systems – is important,” Sanders said on Twitter. “Rebuilding our crumbling human infrastructure – healthcare, education, climate change – is more important. No infrastructure bill without the $3.5tn reconciliation bill.” Progressive groups have echoed Sanders’s argument, insisting that every component of the $3.5tn legislation is vital. Sanders had initially called for spending $6tn on the budget bill, so progressives already view the current price tag as a concession. “We’re in a moment of crisis. Is this really the time for the Senate to press pause?” Ellen Sciales, the communications director of the climate group Sunrise Movement, said in a statement. She added: “If the Senate can’t pass an incredibly popular climate and jobs plan during a summer of unprecedented, fatal climate disasters, and an economy reeling from a global pandemic, we must abolish the Senate. $3.5tn was the compromise.” Natalia Salgado, the director of federal affairs for the Working Families Party, noted that some progressive economists have suggested the US needs to spend $10tn over 10 years to meet its obligations in the Paris Climate Agreement. “We’re going to come nowhere near that,” Salgado said. “So we can’t afford to lose a single cent in this $3.5tn. Every single penny will count.” Despite the war of words between moderates and progressives, the White House has continued to express confidence that Congress will ultimately reach an agreement on the legislation. “The president and his whole team are proud of and fighting for the substance of his Build Back Better agenda,” a White House official said in a statement. “These are complex processes, but as recent weeks have demonstrated, leaders in Congress and the President know how to move them forward.”

#### Budget will pass on *razor thin* margin due to Biden push and climate provisions offsetting cost

NYT 9-7-21 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/09/us/politics/senate-budget.html

WASHINGTON — Democrats formally began their push on Monday for the most significant expansion of the nation’s social safety net since the Great Society of the 1960s, unveiling a budget blueprint that would spend $3.5 trillion on health care, child and elder care, education and climate change. The budget resolution, which Senate Democrats hope to pass by the end of this week, would allow the caucus to piece together social policy legislation this fall, paid for by raising taxes on the wealthy, large inheritances and corporations. Should all 50 senators who caucus with Democrats hold together, the measure could pass the Senate without a Republican vote, nullifying the filibuster threat. Democrats plan to take up the measure as soon as the Senate approves a separate $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill, which is scheduled for a vote at 11 a.m. Tuesday. Together, the measures could secure virtually all of President Biden’s $4 trillion economic agenda, rebuilding the nation’s roads, bridges, rail lines, water systems and electricity grid while expanding public education, social welfare and health care — and remaking the federal tax code. But the two-pronged effort will test the president’s ability to keep the razor-thin Democratic majorities in both chambers united as his party’s leaders both work with Republicans and maneuver around them. “It is big, bold change — the kind of change America thirsts for,” said Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, in a speech on the Senate floor. He added, “The American people don’t expect one piece of legislation to solve all our nation’s ills — no single law can do that — but we have to start in a bold, strong way.” In a show of unity, Speaker Nancy Pelosi praised what she called “a transformative budget resolution that will achieve the vision of President Biden and congressional Democrats.” Even with the blueprint yet to pass, rank-and-file lawmakers were jockeying to shape the specifics of the legislation it aims to create. The parameters laid out in the resolution and accompanying memos unlock the ability to draft a legislative package, setting the top line spending of $3.5 trillion and dividing it among the dozen committees assigned to hammer out details. With Republicans, who have branded the plan a reckless tax and spending spree, all likely opposed, Democrats will need to remain virtually united in both chambers — a difficult prospect, given that moderates have already begun to raise concerns about the price tag. Democrats hope to expand upon a number of provisions in the $1.9 trillion pandemic relief package they muscled past unanimous Republican opposition in March, the last time they used the fast-track budget reconciliation process to avoid the 60-vote filibuster threshold. That includes continuing a temporary expansion of health insurance subsidies offered through the Affordable Care Act and extending the duration of monthly payments now going to most families with children, a provision estimated to cut child poverty by nearly half. Editors’ Picks A Vermeer Restoration Reveals a God of Desire A Writer Reckons With the Fact That ‘People Love Dead Jews’ What Is ‘American Fashion’ Now? But it is what they intend to create from scratch that would be transformative. The provisions include expanding Medicare to include dental, hearing and vision benefits, and possibly lowering the eligibility age. New funding would be provided for older or disabled Americans who want long-term care in their homes. Preschool and two years of community college tuition would be made free, effectively expanding the nation’s public education system. Senator Bernie Sanders, the Vermont independent who is chairman of the Budget Committee, and other senior lawmakers want the United States to have an expansive paid family and medical leave system, like many other developed countries. Image Pascal Jean Jaques teaching math to students at a prekindergarten program in Queens this year. The resolution includes new funding for universal preschool. Pascal Jean Jaques teaching math to students at a prekindergarten program in Queens this year. The resolution includes new funding for universal preschool.Credit...James Estrin/The New York Times Through the legislation, Democrats will also aim to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and prevent wildfires, fund research on the effects of climate change on agriculture, create a Civilian Climate Corps to carry out climate-related public works and make the nation’s coastlines more resilient to the damage caused by rising seas and stronger storms. The plan also includes changes to the tax code to promote electric vehicles — including tax credits to consumers for purchasing electric vehicles and to automakers for building and selling them. It includes a plan to finance domestic manufacturing of electric vehicles and parts. It also calls for provisions to lower the price of prescription drugs, which the Finance Committee chairman, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, said would include “making good on Democrats’ promise to allow Medicare to negotiate a fair price with Big Pharma,” a measure sought for years by Democrats, and by former President Donald J. Trump. It could provide what could be the largest one-time infrastructure investment for Native communities, according to summaries circulated by Senate Democrats. “We are going to go forward and pass this legislation because the time is long overdue for the U.S. Congress to make sure that we are creating the millions of good-paying jobs that the American people desperately need,” Mr. Sanders said. He drafted the resolution in close coordination with Representative John Yarmuth, Democrat of Kentucky, his House counterpart. Stymied by Republican opposition, Democrats also aim to push the boundaries of the budget reconciliation process, which has strict rules about what can and cannot be shielded from the filibuster. It calls for a path to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants and provisions to beef up enforcement of labor laws and penalties for employers that violate them, although those policies may ultimately be left out for violating those budgetary rules. Democrats also plan to include a Clean Electricity Payment Program, which would pay electric utilities to reduce their use of planet-warming coal and natural gas over the next decade and replace them with zero-carbon sources of electricity such as wind, solar and nuclear power. Democrats hope that structuring the program to involve federal expenditures will allow it to pass muster with the Senate parliamentarian, who will rule on what measures are acceptable under the Senate’s rules. Tackling climate change could also help pay for some of the spending: it includes a “carbon polluter import fee” — essentially, a tariff on goods imported from nations that have weak climate change policies.

#### Antitrust enforcement requires PC.

Peter Carstensen 21. Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School. “THE “OUGHT” AND “IS LIKELY” OF BIDEN ANTITRUST”. Feb 2021. Concurrences. https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en

16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

#### Dem unity’s key.

Greg Sargent 8/13/21. Opinion columnist covering national politics. “Opinion: Meet the handful of Democrats who are threatening to derail Biden’s agenda”. Washington Post. Aug 13 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/13/meet-handful-democrats-who-are-threatening-derail-bidens-agenda/

A handful of centrist Democrats issued a stark threat on Friday morning: If the House does not hold an immediate vote on the bipartisan infrastructure bill that passed the Senate, they will withhold support for a procedural measure that’s necessary to pass the larger reconciliation bill.

Let’s be clear: This is a threat to tank the entire process that has been carefully constructed to ensure that President Biden’s full agenda makes it to his desk.

This underscores just how careful a balance Democrats must strike to keep their coalition together to ensure that Biden’s agenda becomes law. It also shows what a tremendous feat it will be if they can pull it off.

The threat came in a new letter from nine centrist House Democrats to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), which lays out demands for how the process should unfold from here.

“We will not consider voting for a budget resolution until the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act passes the House and is signed into law,” reads the letter, which is led by Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.) and signed by other members of the House Problem Solvers Caucus.

The “budget resolution” is what the House must pass to lay the groundwork to eventually pass the $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill that Senate Democrats are now assembling. The bipartisan bill is the $1 trillion in “hard” infrastructure that recently passed the Senate.

So this is a threat to scuttle the process needed to pass the “human” infrastructure bill — including big investments in combating climate change, supports for children and families, expanded health care, and much more — to force immediate passage of the “hard” infrastructure package.

#### Biden PC’s key to unity – detail-sorting in the budget. Moderate Dems are in line.

Leila Fadel and Kelsey Snell 8/25/21. national correspondent for NPR. Congressional correspondent for NPR, MA in Journalism from Northwestern. “Lawmakers In The House Narrowly Approved A $3.5 Trillion Budget Blueprint”. NPR (via WUWM 89.7). Aug 25 2021. https://www.wuwm.com/politics-government/2021-08-25/lawmakers-in-the-house-narrowly-approved-a-3-5-trillion-budget-blueprint

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi yesterday kept her Democratic caucus together to advance the party's $3.5 trillion budget framework. But the hard work of deciding what exactly will be in that budget bill remains ahead. Pelosi herself nodded at some of the future challenges.

(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)

NANCY PELOSI: This legislation will be the biggest and perhaps most controversial initiatives that any of us have ever undertaken in our official lives.

FADEL: Before members of the House left town, they also passed voting rights legislation named after the late Congressman John Lewis.

NPR congressional correspondent Kelsey Snell is here. Good morning.

KELSEY SNELL, BYLINE: Good morning.

FADEL: So, Kelsey, we spoke yesterday, and Democrats were stuck with moderates refusing to go along with Speaker Nancy Pelosi's plan to advance these bills. How did she get this massive budget framework to move forward?

SNELL: Well, Pelosi has been saying since June that there would be no vote on the bipartisan infrastructure bill until the Senate passed a separate $3.5 trillion partisan spending package. So centrists were willing - unwilling to sign on to that, and they successfully lobbied to get a specific date, September 27, as the official date that they will get a vote on the bipartisan bill regardless of what happens with that partisan bill. Now, that is a victory for them in the sense that they were able to separate the two issues and give themselves an opportunity to, you know, have a chance to vote on infrastructure if the Democrats are not able to come together on that very complicated process of writing $3.5 trillion of spending. But they used a lot of political capital to do that. And, you know, Pelosi has to satisfy moderates and progressives alike. And now progressives think they're owed something here, and that may make the next round of talks more complicated.

FADEL: So this, as you mentioned, is just one step. What's the path ahead?

SNELL: Well, now, as I said, they have to rewrite the bills. They have to work together. Moderates in the House and the Senate and progressives in both chambers have to write $3.5 trillion in spending. And that is going to be difficult because they have to agree on more than just the idea that they want to address climate change and education and paid family leave. They actually have to write the policies. And that's going to be a real test of Democrats' willingness to unify and President Biden's ability to kind of bridge differences within his own party to try to get to a deal. It will certainly be difficult. And, you know, members will be working together over the next month to do that.

#### Legislation can knock centuries of climate impacts off in the first 100 days

Mann 1-12-2021, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric Science at Pennsylvania State University (Michael, “The president needs to hit the ground running on climate,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-01/the-president-needs-to-hit-the-ground-running-on-climate/)

That’s why comprehensive climate policy should be a top priority in the first 100 days of a prospective Biden administration. President-Elect Biden must use his decades of experience as a legislator to build the political consensus necessary, and then usher comprehensive climate action through Congress. Biden has put forward a bold climate plan with ambitious targets for reducing carbon emissions and support for both regulatory and market-driven policy measures, as have Senate and House Democrats. There is real opportunity for meaningful climate legislation, but it will require some degree of compromise. The precise makeup—and even control—of the Senate is currently unknown; two runoff elections in Georgia scheduled in January will determine whether the Senate is under Republican or Democratic control. Even with Democratic control of the Senate combined with elimination of the filibuster—which has proven the bane of congressional climate policy—some degree of political compromise will be necessary. Some conservative Democrats, for example, are unlikely to support anything like the currently proposed Green New Deal. When my upcoming book on climate change went to press this summer, the publisher asked me to hazard a guess as to where we’d likely be at this point. I’m pleased to say that the text anticipated things pretty well: Given an even modestly favorable shift in political winds, one could envision [a bold climate bill] passing the House and moving on to the Senate with a half-dozen or more moderate conservatives crossing the aisle, joining with Senate Democrats to pass the bill within the next year or two… The president, in short, will have to win over potential allies in the middle, yet remain unafraid to play hardball with the Congress people who are captured by the fossil fuel industry. That, really, is what we need: A president who can unite us and who can lead us forward, together to tackle the great challenges we face. In the first 100 days he can help solve a crisis that would otherwise afflict us for the next 10,000 years.

#### Budget key to solve climate change.

Dino Grandoni and Brady Dennis 8/11/21. Reporter covering energy and environmental policy. Reporter focusing on environmental policy and public health issues. “Biden aims for sweeping climate action as infrastructure, budget bills advance”. Washington Post. Aug 11 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/08/10/biden-climate-congress/

After years of dragging their feet, lawmakers in Washington advanced a pair of major bills this week that include significant provisions for tackling climate change as scientists continue to ring alarm bells about the state of the planet.

The Senate approved on Tuesday a sweeping bipartisan $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill with funding for many public works meant to cut climate-warning emissions. A day later, Democrats in the chamber took a major step to adopt an even bigger, $3.5 trillion budget bill supporting yet more programs for cleaning up power plants and cars.

Each, if passed, would invest billions of dollars in the sort of clean energy transition the United States must make to have any chance of hitting the goal set by President Biden to cut the nation’s emissions by at least 50 percent by the end of this decade.

“This was one of the most significant legislative days we’ve had in a long time here,” Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) told reporters Wednesday.

But both bills face a potentially bumpy road ahead. Democrats still need to draft in committees the details of their massive budget reconciliation package over the coming weeks, with not a single vote to spare in the 50-50 split Senate. The bipartisan public-works bill, meanwhile, still needs approval from the House, where progressive Democrats hold significant sway.

The moves on Capitol Hill come as hundreds of scientists detailed this week the intensifying fires, floods and other catastrophes that will continue to worsen until humans dramatically scale back greenhouse gas emissions.

Scientists assembled by the United Nations made clear in a landmark report Monday that time is running out for the world to make immediate and dramatic cuts to emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels and other human activities. U.N. Secretary General António Guterres called the sobering, sprawling report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change a “code red for humanity.”

But it remains unclear whether the new findings alone will be enough to spur new action in a Washington as politically divided as ever.

Climate change remains a distinctly fraught issue in the United States compared with many other countries, with the de facto leader of one of the two major parties — former president Donald Trump — dismissing the scientific consensus about human-caused climate change and downplaying its risks throughout his term.

Even if Congress passes bills with big climate provisions, regulations from the Biden administration are vulnerable to being reined in by federal court judges appointed by Trump and the most conservative Supreme Court in a generation. And the fate of many of the administration’s climate initiatives could depend on the Democratic Party retaining control of Congress — and on how Biden himself fares if he runs again in 2024.

If Biden and his Democratic allies in Congress succeed in shifting the nation rapidly toward a greener future, the math of climate change means that the rest of the world would have to follow suit, and quickly. The United States accounts for only about one-seventh of global emissions. The rest of the world — particularly the world’s largest emitter, China — would need to set more aggressive goals for reducing footprints as well.

Other countries have taken steps to do that. The European Union, for instance, agreed earlier this year to cut carbon emissions as a bloc by at least 55 percent by 2030. But how aggressively China, India, Russia and other nations will move in the years ahead remains an open question.

World leaders already faced mounting pressure to arrive at a major U.N. climate conference scheduled this fall in Scotland with more ambitious, concrete plans to slow greenhouse gas pollution. That pressure grew only more intense after Monday’s IPCC assessment, which found that the world is quickly running out of time to meet the goals of the 2015 Paris agreement.

The report found that humans can only unleash less than 500 additional gigatons of carbon dioxide — the equivalent of about 10 years of current global emissions — to have an even chance of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels.

The hopes of hitting that target, the most aspirational goal outlined in the Paris accord, will soon slip away without rapid action, the report made clear. After all, the world has already warmed more than 1 degree Celsius (1.8 degrees Fahrenheit), with few signs of slowing unless nations begin to cut emissions at a rate unprecedented in history.

For Biden to live up to his promises to reduce U.S. emissions sharply in coming years, transition to electric vehicles and eliminate the carbon footprint of the power sector by 2035, his administration needs a helping hand from Congress.

The infrastructure package, which the Senate approved in a 69-to-30 vote with the support of 19 Senate Republicans, apportions billions of dollars for building new transmission lines, public transit and electric-car charging stations.

Meanwhile, the separate $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill, which Democrats plan to pass on their own, includes more far-reaching provisions for tackling climate change.

That measure would impose new import fees on polluters and give tax breaks for wind turbines, solar panels and electric vehicles. It would also seek to electrify vehicles used by the U.S. Postal Service and other federal agencies and create a new Civilian Climate Corps to enlist young people in planting trees and other conservation work.

Perhaps most crucially, the legislation would put new requirements on electricity providers to use cleaner forms of energy — something President Barack Obama’s administration tried but failed to do.

Dan Lashof, U.S. director of the World Resources Institute, called Tuesday’s bipartisan infrastructure package “a down payment” on the fight against climate change but not nearly enough going forward. He said it is essential for the Senate to also pass the budget-reconciliation package that funds a broader array of climate-focused measures to create jobs and shift the nation’s infrastructure toward one no longer reliant on fossil fuels.

“The forthcoming reconciliation package could be our best opportunity for advancing climate action this decade,” he said. “Kicking the can down the road is no longer an option as extreme weather wreaks havoc across our nation and around the world.”

Passing both bills, along with tighter regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency, “puts us within shooting distance” reducing emissions by 50 percent by 2030, according to Collin O’Mara, president of the National Wildlife Federation.

### 2ac 4: AT Afghan Withdrawal

#### Afghanistan pushed Biden to the brink—magnifies the proportion of the link

2AC Kapur 8-22-21

(Sahil, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/honeymoon-over-afghanistan-chaos-comes-critical-moment-biden-s-agenda-n1277338)

WASHINGTON — President Joe Biden’s honeymoon with congressional Democrats appeared to reach an abrupt halt last week when a number of his allies on Capitol Hill began pummeling his execution of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, promising investigations. It’s a precarious moment for Biden, who needs to save his political capital to pass his ambitious agenda with thin Democratic majorities. House leaders are battling dissent among moderate lawmakers skeptical of the dual-track strategy to approve a $550 billion infrastructure bill and a $3.5 trillion package to expand the social safety net and raise taxes on the wealthy. Some insiders see a new phase for relations between Biden and Democrats. “The relationship has certainly hit a rough spot,” said Jim Manley, who was an aide to former Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid of Nevada. “On a whole host of issues, he’s had a pretty good run since becoming president. Now I think the relationship is going to get a little trickier from here on out.” He said he was “surprised by the tough tone” that key Democratic committee chairs like Rep. Gregory Meeks of New York and Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey took on Afghanistan, adding that they appear determined to conduct “rigorous” oversight of Biden, their fellow Democrat. The larger political impact of the chaos in Afghanistan is unclear. Polls taken during the chaos found that Americans still prefer withdrawing over remaining. But the situation has enveloped the White House in a near-term crisis that may limit its persuasive powers over Democratic lawmakers. An NBC News poll released Sunday found that Biden's job approval rating is 49 percent, while 48 percent of U.S. adults disapprove. That is down from April, when Biden drew 53 percent approval and 39 percent disapproval.

#### Withdrawal *saved* Bidens political agenda—it indicates that he has the PC to push the bill now

Nomikos, PhD, 9-1-21

(William G. Nomikos is assistant professor of political science at Washington University in St. Louis and director of the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project. He is currently working on a book about international military intervention entitled Local Peace, International Builders. https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/570422-everyone-has-an-opinion-on-afghanistan-do-voters-care)

Biden’s political calculation Voters are not closely engaged with current events, often seeking to avoid politics altogether. Humanitarian disasters quickly disappear from headlines. Consider that less than a week after the Taliban overtook Kabul, news from Afghanistan did not make the front page of newspapers is several major cities. On the flip said, the potential costs of staying in Afghanistan would be enormous. Currently, President Biden is focused on getting Congress to pass a $1 trillion infrastructure bill and a $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill that, together, would comprise much of his first term agenda. Given the importance of these domestic issues to voters relative to foreign policy, passing the bills through Congress will be the most important politically for Biden. According to estimates, the war in Afghanistan alone has already cost American taxpayers more than $2.2 trillion. Concerns about the combined price tag of Democrats’ legislative agenda have triggered concerns about federal spending and inflation. More spending on Afghanistan would make Biden and his fellow Democrats even more vulnerable to such attacks. The slim margins in Congress suggests that Biden must reserve his political capital to maintain the existing coalitions to pass these two bills, not a new war effort. Doing so would also offer the Democrats the best chance for retaining control of Congress in the 2022 midterm elections.

AT Evidence (American convervative)

### 2ac 5: Doesn’t Cause Warming

#### Warming causes extinction – global nuclear conflagration.

Michael Klare 20. The Nation’s defense correspondent, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College, senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War”. The Nation. Jan 13 2020. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/

President Donald Trump may not accept the scientific reality of climate change, but the nation’s senior military leaders recognize that climate disruption is already underway, and they are planning extraordinary measures to prevent it from spiraling into nuclear war. One particularly worrisome scenario is if extreme drought and abnormal monsoon rains devastate agriculture and unleash social chaos in Pakistan, potentially creating an opening for radical Islamists aligned with elements of the armed forces to seize some of the country’s 150 or so nuclear weapons. To avert such a potentially cataclysmic development, the US Joint Special Operations Command has conducted exercises for infiltrating Pakistan and locating the country’s nuclear munitions. Most of the necessary equipment for such raids is already in position at US bases in the region, according to a 2011 report from the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. “It’s safe to assume that planning for the worst-case scenario regarding Pakistan’s nukes has already taken place inside the US government,” said Roger Cressey, a former deputy director for counterterrorism in Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s administrations in 2011.

Such an attack by the United States would be an act of war and would entail enormous risks of escalation, especially since the Pakistani military—the country’s most powerful institution—views the nation’s nuclear arsenal as its most prized possession and would fiercely resist any US attempt to disable it. “These are assets which are the pride of Pakistan, assets which are…guarded by a corps of 18,000 soldiers,” former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf told NBC News in 2011. The Pakistani military “is not an army which doesn’t know how to fight. This is an army that has fought three wars. Please understand that.”

A potential US military incursion in nuclear-armed Pakistan is just one example of a crucial but little-​discussed aspect of international politics in the early 21st century: how the acceleration of climate change and nuclear war planning may make those threats to human survival harder to defuse. At present, the intersections between climate change and nuclear war might not seem obvious. But powerful forces are pushing both threats toward their most destructive outcomes.

In the case of climate change, the unbridled emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is raising global temperatures to unmistakably dangerous levels. Despite growing worldwide reliance on wind and solar power for energy generation, the global demand for oil and natural gas continues to rise, and carbon emissions are projected to remain on an upward trajectory for the foreseeable future. It is highly unlikely, then, that the increase in average global temperature can be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the aspirational goal adopted by the world’s governments under the Paris Agreement in 2015, or even to 2°C, the actual goal. After that threshold is crossed, scientists agree, it will prove almost impossible to avert catastrophic outcomes, such as the collapse of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and a resulting sea level rise of 6 feet or more.

Climbing world temperatures and rising sea levels will diminish the supply of food and water in many resource-deprived areas, increasing the risk of widespread starvation, social unrest, and human flight. Global corn production, for example, is projected to fall by as much as 14 percent in a 2°C warmer world, according to research cited in a 2018 special report by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Food scarcity and crop failures risk pushing hundreds of millions of people into overcrowded cities, where the likelihood of pandemics, ethnic strife, and severe storm damage is bound to increase. All of this will impose an immense burden on human institutions. Some states may collapse or break up into a collection of warring chiefdoms—all fighting over sources of water and other vital resources.

A similar momentum is now evident in the emerging nuclear arms race, with all three major powers—China, Russia, and the United States—rushing to deploy a host of new munitions. This dangerous process commenced a decade ago, when Russian and Chinese leaders sought improvements to their nuclear arsenals and President Barack Obama, in order to secure Senate approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010, agreed to initial funding for the modernization of all three legs of America’s strategic triad, which encompasses submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers. (New START, which mandated significant reductions in US and Russian arsenals, will expire in February 2021 unless renewed by the two countries.) Although Obama initiated the modernization of the nuclear triad, the Trump administration has sought funds to proceed with their full-scale production, at an estimated initial installment of $500 billion over 10 years.

Even during the initial modernization program of the Obama era, Russian and Chinese leaders were sufficiently alarmed to hasten their own nuclear acquisitions. Both countries were already in the process of modernizing their stockpiles—Russia to replace Cold War–era systems that had become unreliable, China to provide its relatively small arsenal with enhanced capabilities. Trump’s decision to acquire a whole new suite of ICBMs, nuclear-armed submarines, and bombers has added momentum to these efforts. And with all three major powers upgrading their arsenals, the other nuclear-weapon states—led by India, Pakistan, and North Korea—have been expanding their stockpiles as well. Moreover, with Trump’s recent decision to abandon the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, all major powers are developing missile delivery systems for a regional nuclear war such as might erupt in Europe, South Asia, or the western Pacific.

All things being equal, rising temperatures will increase the likelihood of nuclear war, largely because climate change will heighten the risk of social stress, the decay of nation-states, and armed violence in general, as I argue in my new book, All Hell Breaking Loose. As food and water supplies dwindle and governments come under ever-increasing pressure to meet the vital needs of their populations, disputes over critical resources are likely to become more heated and violent, whether the parties involved have nuclear arms or not. But this danger is compounded by the possibility that several nuclear-armed powers—notably India, Pakistan, and China—will break apart as a result of climate change and accompanying battles over disputed supplies of water.

Together, these three countries are projected by the UN Population Division to number approximately 3.4 billion people in 2050, or 34 percent of the world’s population. Yet they possess a much smaller share of the world’s freshwater supplies, and climate change is destined to reduce what they have even further. Warmer temperatures are also expected to diminish crop yields in these countries, adding to the desperation of farmers and very likely resulting in widespread ethnic strife and population displacement. Under these circumstances, climate-related internal turmoil would increase the risk of nuclear war in two ways: by enabling the capture of nuclear arms by rogue elements of the military and their possible use against perceived enemies and by inciting wars between these states over vital supplies of water and other critical resources.

The risk to Pakistan from climate change is thought to be particularly acute. A large part of the population is still engaged in agriculture, and much of the best land—along with access to water—is controlled by wealthy landowners (who also dominate national politics). Water scarcity and mismanagement is a perennial challenge, and climate change is bound to make the problem worse. Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, a 2013 report by the National Research Council for the US intelligence community, highlights the danger of chaos and conflict in that country as global warming advances. Pakistan, the report notes, is expected to suffer from inadequate water supplies during the dry season and severe flooding during the monsoon—outcomes that will devastate its agriculture and amplify the poverty and unrest already afflicting much of the country. “The Pakistan case,” the report reads, “illustrates how a highly stressed environmental system on which a tense society depends can be a source of political instability and how that source can intensify when climate events put increased stress on the system.” Thus, as global temperatures rise and agriculture declines, Pakistan could shatter along ethnic, class, and religious lines, precisely the scenario that might trigger the sort of intervention anticipated by the US Joint Special Operations Command.

Assuming that Pakistan remains intact, another great danger arising from increasing world temperatures is a conflict between it and India or between China and India over access to shared river systems. Whatever their differences, Pakistan and western India are forced by geography to share a single river system, the Indus, for much of their water requirements. Likewise, western China and eastern India also share a river, the Brahmaputra, for their vital water needs. The Indus and the Brahmaputra obtain much of their flow from periods of heavy precipitation; they also depend on meltwater from Himalayan glaciers, and these are at risk of melting because of rising temperatures. According to the IPCC, the Himalayan glaciers could lose as much as 29 percent of their total mass by 2035 and 78 percent by 2100. This would produce periodic flooding as the ice melts but would eventually result in long periods of negligible flow, with calamitous consequences for downstream agriculture. The widespread starvation and chaos that could result would prove daunting to all the governments involved and make any water-related disputes between them a potential flash point for escalation.

As in Pakistan, water supply has always played a pivotal role in the social and economic life of China and India, with both countries highly dependent on a few major river systems for civic and agricultural purposes. Excessive rainfall can lead to catastrophic flooding, and prolonged drought has often led to widespread famine and mass starvation. In such a setting, water management has always been a prime responsibility of government—and a failure to fulfill this function effectively has often resulted in civil unrest. Climate change is bound to increase this danger by causing prolonged water shortages interspersed with severe flooding. This has prompted leaders of both countries to build ever more dams on all key rivers.

India, as the upstream power on several tributaries of the Indus, and China, as the upstream power on the Brahmaputra, have considered damming these rivers and diverting their waters for exclusive national use, thereby diminishing the flow to downstream users. Three of the Indus’s principal tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab, and Ravi rivers, flow through Indian-controlled Kashmir (now in total lockdown, with government forces suppressing all public functions). It’s possible that India seeks full control of Kashmir in order to dam the tributaries there and divert their waters from Pakistan—a move that could easily trigger a war if it occurs at a time of severe food and water stress and one that would very likely invite the use of nuclear weapons, given Pakistan’s attitude toward them.

The situation regarding the Brahmaputra could prove equally precarious. China has already installed one dam on the river, the Zangmu Dam in Tibet, and has announced plans for several more. Some Chinese hydrologists have proposed the construction of canals linking the Brahmaputra to more northerly rivers in China, allowing the diversion of its waters to drought-stricken areas of the heavily populated northeast. These plans have yet to come to fruition, but as global warming increases water scarcity across northern China, Beijing might proceed with the idea. “If China was determined to move forward with such a scheme,” the US National Intelligence Council warned in 2009, “it could become a major element in pushing China and India towards an adversarial rather than simply a competitive relationship.”

Severe water scarcity in northern China could prompt yet another move with nuclear implications: an attempted annexation by China of largely uninhabited but water-rich areas of Russian Siberia. Thousands of Chinese farmers and merchants have already taken up residence in eastern Siberia, and some commentators have spoken of a time when climate change prompts a formal Chinese takeover of those areas—which would almost certainly prompt fierce Russian resistance and the possible use of nuclear weapons.

In the Arctic, global warming is producing a wholly different sort of peril: geopolitical competition and conflict made possible by the melting of the polar ice cap. Before long, the Arctic ice cap is expected to disappear in summertime and to shrink noticeably in the winter, making the region more attractive for resource extraction. According to the US Geological Survey, an estimated 30 percent of the world’s remaining undiscovered natural gas is above the Arctic Circle; vast reserves of iron ore, uranium, and rare earth minerals are also thought to be buried there. These resources, along with the appeal of faster commercial shipping routes linking Europe and Asia, have induced all the major powers, including China, to establish or expand operations in the region. Russia has rehabilitated numerous Arctic bases abandoned after the Cold War and built others; the United States has done likewise, modernizing its radar installation at Thule in Greenland, reoccupying an airfield at Keflavík in Iceland, and establishing bases in northern Norway.

Increased economic and military competition in the Arctic has significant nuclear implications, as numerous weapons are deployed there and geography lends it a key role in many nuclear scenarios. Most of Russia’s missile-carrying submarines are based near Murmansk, on the Barents Sea (an offshoot of the Arctic Ocean), and many of its nuclear-armed bombers are also at bases in the region to take advantage of the short polar route to North America. As a counterweight, the Pentagon has deployed additional subs and antisubmarine aircraft near the Barents Sea and interceptor aircraft in Alaska, followed by further measures by Moscow. “I do not want to stoke any fears here,” Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in June 2017, “but experts are aware that US nuclear submarines remain on duty in northern Norway…. We must protect [Russia’s] shore accordingly.”

On the other side of the equation, an intensifying arms race will block progress against climate change by siphoning resources needed for a global energy transition and by poisoning the relations among the great powers, impeding joint efforts to slow the warming.

With the signing of the Paris Agreement, it appeared that the great powers might unite in a global effort to slash greenhouse gas emissions quickly enough to avoid catastrophe, but those hopes have since receded. At the time, Obama emphasized that limiting global warming would require nations to work together in an environment of trust and peaceful cooperation. Instead of leading the global transition to a postcarbon energy system, however, the major powers are spending massively to enhance their military capabilities and engaging in conflict-provoking behaviors.

Since fiscal year 2016, the annual budget of the US Department of Defense has risen from $580 billion to $738 billion in fiscal year 2020. When the budget increases for each fiscal year since 2016 are combined, the United States will have spent an additional $380 billion on military programs by the end of this fiscal year—more than enough to jump-start the transition to a carbon-​free economy. If the Pentagon budget rises as planned to $747 billion in fiscal year 2024, a total of $989 billion in additional spending will have been devoted to military operations and procurement over this period, leaving precious little money for a Green New Deal or any other scheme for systemic decarbonization.

Meanwhile, policy-makers in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow increasingly regard one another as implacable and dangerous adversaries. “As China and Russia seek to expand their global influence,” then–Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats informed Congress in a January 2019 report, “they are eroding once well-established security norms and increasing the risk of regional conflicts.” Chinese and Russian officials have been making similar statements about the United States. Secondary powers like India, Pakistan, and Turkey are also assuming increasingly militaristic postures, facilitating the potential spread of nuclear weapons and exacerbating regional tensions. In this environment, it is almost impossible to imagine future climate negotiations at which the great powers agree on concrete measures for a rapid transition to a clean energy economy.

In a world constantly poised for nuclear war while facing widespread state decay from climate disruption, these twin threats would intermingle and intensify each other. Climate-​related resource stresses and disputes would increase the level of global discord and the risk of nuclear escalation; the nuclear arms race would poison relations between states and make a global energy transition impossible.

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